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Introduction

Boethius and his Consolation
The Consolation of Philosophy was written while its author, Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius
(c. 475-526 C.E.), was in prison, awaiting execution. A member of the Roman aristocracy by birth, and a
scholar trained in the Greek tradition, Boethius had devoted much of his life to translating and
commenting on classic philosophical works, especially the logical works of Aristotle; he had also written
a number of mathematical and logical textbooks, as well as a series of treatises that applied his work in
logic to contemporary theological problems. However, in about 520 C.E., Boethius gave up his private
life in Rome to become “Master of Offices” for the Ostragothic king, Theodoric, in Ravenna, Italy. As
Master of Offices, Boethius was the intermediary between Theodoric and the rest of the government
officials, a position fraught with political pitfalls. Shortly after he took office, Boethius fell into imperial
disfavor—probably because he had exposed the corruption of top officials—and was sentenced to death
on charges of treason and witchcraft.1
Torn from his family and stripped of his political power, Boethius returned to the pursuit that
had characterized his earlier life: writing. The Consolation of Philosophy is a dialogue between a prisoner
(assumed to be Boethius himself) and Lady Philosophy, the incarnation of wisdom.2 The action begins
when Philosophy descends to the prisoner’s cell to console him in his misfortune, and the conversation
that ensues ranges from a discussion of the prisoner’s personal misfortune to philosophically complex
arguments about the nature of fortune, happiness, evil, and free will. The resulting text is a
sophisticated blend of poetry and prose, and a powerful exploration of major philosophical and
1

John Marenbon, “Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009
Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, 6 May 2005, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/boethius/>;
cf., John Marenbon, Boethius (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003), 9.
2
To avoid any confusion between Boethius-the-author and Boethius-the-character, I will refer to Lady Philosophy’s
interlocutor as “the prisoner” and the author of the Consolation as “Boethius;” for the sake of brevity, I shall also
refer to Lady Philosophy simply as “Philosophy.”
4

theological problems, that has captured the attention of philosophers, scholars, theologians, and lay
readers for centuries.

The genre of consolation
The Consolation derives its title from the literary genre of consolation, a genre whose purpose in
the ancient world “was to show why a particular apparent evil (old age, exile, the loss of a beloved one,
death) is not really something to fear or lament at all.”3 The literary works of which the genre was
comprised were formally diverse. Consolatory works took the form of philosophical treatises which
explored the conceptual structure of sorrow, they were frequently published as open letters or poems,
and they were delivered as speeches. 4 However, despite their diversity, works of consolation were
united by the overarching theme of grief: they sought to comfort the bereaved and provide the friends
of the dead with reasons for why death ought not be feared. 5
The Consolation is not a paradigmatic consolation (for reasons discussed below), but it clearly
aligns itself with the genre in at least two ways. First, Boethius’ Consolation is clearly inspired by some of
the traditional reasons for consolation. Although the grief addressed in a consolation was typically
occasioned by the death of a loved one, it could also stem from loss in a more general sense (e.g., the
loss of one’s youth or country or social status). The prisoner is not mourning the death of anyone he
loves; however, he is mourning his own impending death, his forced separation from his family and
friends, and the loss of his reputation, power, and personal freedom. Second, the structure of the
Consolation reflects two of the fundamental values of the traditional consolation. Like a traditional
3

John Marenbon, “Rationality and Happiness: Interpreting Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy,” in Rationality
and Happiness: From the Ancients to the Early Medievals, edited by Jiyuan Yu and Jorge J.E. Gracia (Rochester:
University of Rochester Press, 2003), 175.
4
J.H.D. Scourfield, introduction to Consoling Heliodorus: A Commentary on Jerome, Letter 60 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1993), 16-17.
5
Joel C. Relihan, introduction to The Prisoner’s Philosophy: Life and Death in Boethius’s Consolation (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), xi; cf., James McEvoy, “Ultimate Goods: happiness, friendship, and bliss,”
in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, edited by A.S. McGrade, 259 and Michael H. Means, The
Consolatio Genre in Medieval English Literature (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972), 8.
5

consolation, it assumes that words and, in this case, dialogue have curative properties.6 And the
Consolation’s movement from the prisoner’s practical concerns to Philosophy’s theoretical arguments
mirrors the traditional consolation’s effort to console by guiding the bereaved away from personal
distress and toward a more objective understanding of grief. 7
These connections between the Consolation and the genre of consolation help explain the
Consolation’s title and give us some reason to categorize it as a bona fide consolatory work, but they are
overshadowed by the fact that the Consolation flouts a number of genre-specific conventions: the text is
not addressed to anyone in particular; the title itself is ambiguous (who, precisely, is being consoled?
Philosophy or some other, unnamed person?); it is composed of both prose and poetry; and it begins in
media res. In contrast, traditional consolations “set the stage much more clearly and unambiguously;”
there is no question about who the addressee is or what the particulars of the situation are. 8 Finally,
the Consolation neglects the central problem of most consolatory works: death. Joel C. Relihan aptly
summarizes the situation:
The word consolation cannot help but bring to a reader’s mind solace in the face of
death; and this solace embraces such things as assertions of the immortality of the soul,
descriptions of the rewards of the blessed, and visions of eternity. None of these is to be
found in the text. . . . Further, Consolation offers no reasons why death is not to be
feared and spends most of its time taking the narrator’s impending death for granted, in
order to talk of other things, none of which involves a beatific vision. Certainly, the word
“consolation” does not by itself a consolation make, yet there remains the interesting
question: Why label a work with what seems to be a false promise?9
I disagree with Relihan’s claim that Philosophy neglects to provide the prisoner with an account of “the
rewards of the blessed” (Book IV contains a lengthy description of reward and punishment) and that her
consolation lacks “visions of eternity” (Book V discusses eternity, albeit in a distinctly philosophical,
rather than devotional, vein). However, Relihan is correct to point out that the topic of death qua death

6

Cf., Scourfield, introduction to Consoling Heliodorus, 18.
Relihan, The Prisoner’s Philosophy, 50.
8
Ibid., 52.
9
Ibid., 48-49.
7
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is not touched in the Consolation. Philosophy’s analyses of happiness, fortune, evil, and free will are not
provided as explicit reasons for the prisoner to accept his imminent death (although they might
comprise an implicit reason for such acceptance); rather, they are presented without regard to the
prisoner’s impending death, a presentation which suggests that the prisoner’s response to the fact of his
death is of little consequence.

The puzzle of the Consolation
Clearly, the Consolation diverges from the genre of consolation in significant ways. This
divergence has occasioned a series of important interpretive questions: How ought we to read a work
that appears to align itself with a given literary genre and then proceeds to break the essential rules of
that genre? Did Boethius attempt to write a traditional consolation and fail, did he write a nontraditional
but genuine consolation, or did he purposefully create a text that parodies a traditional consolation? Put
another way, Should we take the Consolation as a serious attempt at consolation?10
This last question, while potentially illuminating, is too vague; it does not tell us how we ought
to assess the “seriousness” of the Consolation. The project is made especially difficult because the text is
a blend of literature and philosophy: meditative (and philosophical) poems provide a counterpoint to
long sections of densely argued prose; philosophical ideas are knit together with literary motifs; and the
main characters of the work are vehicles of argument and dramatic tension. The multi-faceted nature of
the Consolation has thus led to two divergent interpretive approaches, one literary and the other
philosophical. These approaches, in turn, adopt two different sets of criteria for assessing the
Consolation’s purpose.
Interpretations of the Consolation that focus on its literary elements evaluate the purpose of the
Consolation in terms of the outcome of Philosophy’s consolation of the prisoner: Does Philosophy offer
10

These are not, of course, the only questions raised in the secondary literature on the Consolation. However, as
will be shown, much of the contemporary scholarship can be funneled into this array of questions.
7

the prisoner a coherent picture of the universe? Does the prisoner acknowledge Philosophy’s dramatic
authority, or is he skeptical of her power? Does he accept the consolation Philosophy offers, or does he
reject it? More succinctly, Does Philosophy console the prisoner? In general, if the prisoner bows to
Philosophy’s authority and accepts her consolation, then we have good reason to consider the
Consolation to be a serious (albeit nontraditional) consolation. If, on the other hand, the prisoner rejects
Philosophy’s authority and her consolation, then we have cause to wonder if Boethius really intended
the Consolation seriously.
Conversely, scholars who are more interested in Philosophy’s arguments about fortune,
happiness, evil, and free will than they are in the text’s literary devices evaluate the purpose of the
Consolation in philosophic terms. The adherents of this approach want to know (a) if Philosophy’s major
arguments, considered individually, are valid and (b) if they are consistent with one another. If
Philosophy’s arguments are valid and consistent, then we have good reason to think that Boethius was
seriously advancing those arguments and that the Consolation ought to be taken as a serious (albeit
nontraditional) consolation. If Philosophy’s arguments fail the twin tests of validity and consistency,
then we must concede that either Boethius’s Consolation was an honest but unsuccessful attempt at
consolation, or we must explore other reasons for Philosophy’s failure—perhaps Boethius purposefully
allowed Philosophy to present flawed arguments in order to make a point about philosophy or the goals
of consolatory literature.
These two interpretive approaches to the Consolation are not equally represented in the
secondary literature. Criticism (both contemporary and classic) overwhelming takes the literary
approach; while in contemporary literature, only one scholar (John Marenbon) advances a robustly
philosophical reading of the text. According to the classic (literary) interpretation of the text, the
Consolation ought to be taken seriously, as an honest (if unorthodox) attempt at consolation.
Proponents of the traditional reading include John Haldane, Brian Harding, Donald F. Duclow, and
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Thomas Curley, all of whom claim that Philosophy consoles Boethius, whether she does so by showing
him how to lead a contemplative life (Haldane,11 Duclow,12 and Harding13) or by showing him the inner
workings of the cosmos (Curley14). This reading of the Consolation is attractive because it is relatively
straightforward; it assumes that when Boethius promises us a Consolation, we can expect a consolation.
Unfortunately, the simplicity of this interpretation also leaves it vulnerable to more sophisticated
philosophical and literary counterarguments.
In The Prisoner’s Philosophy, Joel C. Relihan advances a literary reading of the Consolation which
contests the traditional interpretation. He argues that the prisoner ultimately rejects Philosophy’s
consolation and that, consequently, the Consolation ought to be read as a parody of a consolation,
rather than a genuine attempt to console. According to Relihan, the unresolved tension between
Philosophy and the prisoner, the prisoner’s repeated interruptions of Philosophy, Philosophy’s forced
digressions, and Philosophy’s inability to meet her consolatory goals mark the text as an example of
Menippean satire. An ancient literary genre, comprised of a wide variety of works, Menippean satire is
characterized by its representation of the universe as essentially disordered and incoherent, and by its
mockery of attempts to demystify the world.15 For Relihan, Philosophy’s unsuccessful attempt to offer
the prisoner a unified theory of everything results in a fundamental disjointedness that leads the
prisoner (and the reader) to reject the authority of Philosophy and reason.16
Relihan’s ironic interpretation of the Consolation improves upon the traditional reading because
it makes sense of the literary puzzles scattered throughout the text: it explains why it looks as if the
11

John Haldane, “De Consolatione Philosophiae,” in Philosophy, Religion, and the Spiritual Life,” edited by Michael
McGhee, 31-45. Cited in John Fortin, “The Nature of Consolation in The Consolation of Philosophy,” American
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78, no. 2 (2004): 294.
12
Donald F. Duclow, “Perspective and Therapy in Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy,” The Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy 4, no. 3 (1979): 335.
13
Brian Harding, “Metaphysical Speculation and Its Applicability to a Mode of Living: The Case of Boethius’ De
Consolatione Philosophiae,” Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 9 (2004): 82.
14
Thomas F. Curley III, “How to Read the Consolation of Philosophy,” Interpretation: A Journal of Political
Philosophy 14 (1986): 220. Cited in Fortin, “The Nature of Consolation,” 294.
15
Relihan, The Prisoner’s Philosophy, 2.
16
Ibid., 4.
9

central problems of the text (especially those involving free will and the prisoner’s identity) are never
fully resolved; it makes sense of the prisoner’s apparent unwillingness to accept Philosophy’s
arguments; and it places the Consolation in a distinct literary genre, as opposed to classifying it in
negative terms as a “nontraditional” consolation.
However, Relihan’s interpretation, like the traditional readings, is incomplete because it does
not carefully examine the philosophical elements of the text. A strictly literary approach to the
Consolation can be illuminating, but if we focus only on the literary elements of the text, we will only be
able to conclude that, insofar as its literary elements are concerned, the Consolation is ironic or serious.
However, we don’t want to say just that the Consolation, literarily speaking, is (non)serious; we want to
say that the Consolation as a whole is either serious or not. And in order to make this kind of claim, we
must consider its philosophical content as well as its literary form.
John Marenbon’s philosophical interpretation of the text is a useful amendment to Relihan’s
reading. Like Relihan, he argues that the Consolation is ironic; unlike Relihan, he makes his case on
philosophical grounds. The Consolation must be ironic, Marenbon argues, because Philosophy’s
arguments (especially her arguments about happiness and free will) are inconsistent: “if Boethius the
author fully endorses Philosophy’s arguments and positions, then he is guilty of looseness, incoherence,
and confusion.”17 A more charitable reading of the text is that Boethius purposefully casts Philosophy as
inconsistent and unpersuasive in order to question the authority and usefulness of philosophy as a
discipline.18 Though Marenbon agrees with Relihan’s classification of the text as Menippean satire, he
does not think that Boethius intends to suggest that we reject the authority of philosophy altogether;
rather, the Consolation’s treatment of philosophy is meant to encourage us to be carefully skeptical of
the power of reason.19

17

Marenbon, “Rationality and Happiness,” 190.
Ibid., 175-197 (at 192).
19
Marenbon, Boethius, 162.
18
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Marenbon and Relihan make a formidable case for an ironic Consolation. Taken together, their
interpretations make sense of important philosophical and literary anomalies in the text. Their
interpretations are also attractive because they salvage Boethius’s reputation as an author and
philosopher. Without the help of an ironic interpretation, it looks as if Boethius will be doomed to
charges of philosophical and literary incompetency. His arguments may have been intended seriously,
but they are deeply flawed, and he was clearly confused about whether Philosophy or the prisoner was
supposed to have the final word in the text. The ironic reading allows us to interpret the Consolation as
a coherent piece of literature and philosophy without ignoring its apparent literary and philosophical
flaws; better, it reinterprets those “flaws” as the defining elements of the text, as precisely those
elements which render the text coherent. This interpretive move simultaneously saves Boethius from
scholarly disgrace and brings his text in line with modern sensibilities—there is after all something
distinctly vogue about a satirical, self-referring Consolation.

Against an ironic consolation
Despite the obvious attractions of the interpretation, there are two reasons we should be
suspicious of an ironic (i.e., Menippean) Consolation. First, Menippean satire is extraordinarily hard to
define as a genre (though Relihan attempts to do so). There are only a few extant examples of the genre,
and there is enough variation among those examples that Menippean satire verges on being a “catchall” category rather than a distinct genre. Thus, to call the Consolation “Menippean” is merely to place it
among a nebulous set of other, possibly similar, but ultimately different, literary works—works whose
only unifying factor is a fundamental lack of unity.20
Second, the desire to salvage Boethius’s reputation and render the Consolation palatable to
modern taste, while admirable, smacks of anachronism. After all, perhaps Boethius intended the
20

Cf., Danuta Shanzer, “Interpreting the Consolation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Boethius, edited by John
Marenbon (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009), 234-236.
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Consolation to be taken seriously but constructed flawed arguments or stumbled into literary
incoherency on accident; such a case, although an unhappy one, would not be unique to Boethius—
other philosophers have walked that road before him. Maybe Relihan and Marenbon, together with the
various advocates of the traditional reading, are refusing to acknowledge the most elegant solution to
the puzzle of the Consolation: that Boethius was just wrong.
This, of course, is not the most attractive solution to the problem at hand. It would be nice if we
could read Boethius charitably without consigning him to the dustbin of failed philosophical and literary
works. Thankfully, another possibility presents itself. A third counter-argument to the ironic
interpretation is that the reading hinges on apparent philosophical and literary anomalies in the
Consolation. If the problems of literary tension and philosophical inconsistencies described by Relihan
and Marenbon can be resolved, then the ironic interpretation has lost its foundation.

Happiness as the key to a non-ironic Consolation
In what follows, I argue, contra Marenbon and Relihan, that the Consolation is not ironic.
Boethius did not write the Consolation to satirize the discipline of philosophy, but to present a
philosophical theory which he believed ought to be taken seriously. In particular, I argue that Boethius,
through the dialogue between Philosophy and the prisoner, develops a theory of happiness, a theory
that is supposed to help the prisoner (and the audience) resolve the questions about fortune, divine
providence, and free will raised at the beginning of the text.
The main work of this thesis is to trace and analyze the evolution of the Consolation’s theory of
happiness. In Chapter 1, I demonstrate that Philosophy’s primary goal in the Consolation is to show the
prisoner what happiness is and make him truly happy. In Chapters 2 and 3, I argue that Philosophy
achieves this goal by leading the prisoner through a series of consistent (and increasingly rigorous)
philosophical arguments which prove that rationality is the necessary and sufficient condition for
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happiness and which teach the prisoner how to think rationally. Finally, in Chapters 4 and 5, I argue
(once more contra Relihan) that Philosophy’s discussion of free will is not a digression and that the
prisoner’s interruptions of Philosophy are not proof that he rejects her consolation; instead, these
literary tensions are indications that Philosophy has consoled the prisoner, that the prisoner has
accepted her consolation. By the end of the Consolation, the prisoner is able to engage in philosophical
argument. He interrupts Philosophy, redirects their conversation, and challenges her to provide him
with satisfying answers to the questions he originally asked. The prisoner’s renewed control of himself
and the conversation—his rationality—proves that Philosophy has accomplished her goal: the prisoner is
truly happy.
I submit that this happiness-based interpretation of the text provides us with two reasons to
take the Consolation seriously (i.e., to interpret it non-ironically). First, the fact that Philosophy achieves
her consolatory goals—the fact that she does indeed make the prisoner happy—and the fact that the
prisoner accepts Philosophy’s consolation disproves Relihan’s argument that Philosophy fails to console
the prisoner. Thus, we have no literary support for an ironic reading of the Consolation. Second, the fact
that Philosophy’s account of happiness as rationality is consistent and the fact that, with it, we are able
to piece together a consistent reading of her arguments about fortune, providence, and free will as
consistent and valid counters Marenbon’s claim that Philosophy’s arguments are inconsistent and
invalid. There are, therefore, no philosophical grounds for interpreting the Consolation as ironic. Instead,
we are confronted with a Consolation that is philosophically consistent and literarily cohesive, one which
makes a solid case for a definition of happiness as rationality and which ultimately convinces the
prisoner (if not the audience) of the viability of that definition.
My reading of the Consolation places me on the side of a traditional interpretation; like the
proponents of the traditional interpretation, I argue that the Consolation ought to be taken as a serious
consolation. However, my reading of the Consolation is distinct from traditional interpretations for two
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reasons. First, I assess and respond to the ironic reading presented by Marenbon and Relihan, a reading
which poses serious problems for a traditional interpretation of the text. Second, I consider both the
literary and philosophical components of the text. I evaluate the Consolation in terms of whether
Philosophy achieves her consolatory goals (a literary concern) and in terms of the consistency and
validity of her arguments (a philosophical concern), and I conclude that there are philosophical and
literary grounds for a reading of the text as non-ironic. It is important to note, however, that because
this thesis is primarily a philosophical investigation, I do not pretend to give the philosophical and
literary elements of the Consolation equal “air time.” The bulk of the thesis (Chapters 2, 3, and 5) deals
with proving the consistency and validity of the Consolation’s arguments. My hope is that this new
approach—with its emphasis on philosophy and its response to contemporary scholarship—will provide
a defense of a non-ironic Consolation that is more comprehensive and, hence, stronger than its
traditional counterparts.

14

1. Consolatory Goals

Introduction
The place to begin a comprehensive interpretation of the Consolation is at the intersection of
the literary and philosophical approaches to the text, with the identification of Philosophy’s consolatory
goals: What does Philosophy promise the prisoner she will accomplish through her consolation? The
answer to this question is important for a literary interpretation of the text because, in order to
determine whether or not Philosophy keeps her consolatory promises (and Relihan says she does not),
we need to know what kind of consolation Philosophy has committed herself to. Likewise, in order to
assess the philosophical consistency of Philosophy’s arguments throughout the Consolation, we have to
understand her overarching argument.
As established in the introduction, the Consolation is not a traditional consolation. In contrast to
other consolatory texts, and despite the prisoner’s situation, the Consolation does not directly discuss
death. But this does not mean that the text has no consolatory elements whatsoever (in fact we have
already seen that the Consolation is related to the genre of consolation in several important ways); what
it does mean is that we will have to look beyond the conventions of genre for the goal of this particular
consolatory text—we will have to allow Philosophy herself to set the parameters of her consolation. In
this chapter, I take two approaches to examining Philosophy’s goals: in the first section, I explore
Philosophy’s explicit promises to the prisoner and the standard interpretations of those promises; in the
second half of the chapter, I present my interpretation of those promises, arguing that Philosophy’s
implicit consolatory goal is to make the prisoner truly happy.

Philosophy’s explicit consolatory promise
Philosophy makes her first appearance in the Consolation against the backdrop of the prisoner’s
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professional and personal disaster. In the opening poem of the text, the prisoner, aided by the Muses of
poetry, laments his fate at the hands of “faithless Fortune:” once “prosperous and happy,” he is now “a
grieving old man;” he earnestly desires death—but even death withholds herself from him.21 Into this
dismal scene sweeps Philosophy. She immediately disperses the Muses of poetry, chastising them for
their distracting sympathy, and she announces that her own Muses will effect the prisoner’s
“convalescence and cure.”22 This announcement introduces (and is characteristic of) Philosophy’s
approach to the prisoner’s situation throughout the rest of the text. Philosophy assumes that the
prisoner suffers, not from external woes, but from a problem that is distinctly internal; she treats him
like a man who is ill and needs to be healed, not like a man who has been imprisoned and seeks
freedom.
Accordingly, instead of promising to reinstate the prisoner’s good fortune, Philosophy promises
to cure him of his illness. At I.6.18-19, Philosophy summarizes what she sees as the prisoner’s problems:
Consider: Since you are dazed by self-forgetfulness, you lamented that you were an
exile and that you were deprived of goods rightfully yours; further, since you do not
know what is the goal of things, you think that wicked and worthless men are truly
powerful and prosperous; still further, since you have forgotten what are the rudders by
which the world is governed, you reckon that the vicissitudes of individual fortunes bob
up and down without a helmsman. All these are huge causes that lead not only to
disease, but to death as well.
Philosophy diagnoses the prisoner with self-forgetfulness, ignorance of the world’s final cause, and
ignorance of how the world is governed (whether by chance or providence).23 Implicit in this summary is
the claim that if the prisoner realizes who he is, and if he can identify the final cause of the world and
the method by which it is governed, then he will be cured of his illness. Thus, according to this passage,
Philosophy’s broad goal of curing the prisoner can be more precisely described as an effort to help the

21

Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, translated by Joel C. Relihan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), I.1.17, 7-8; 14-16.
(Italicized numbers refer to metered sections, while their un-italicized counterparts refer to prose sections.)
22
Ibid., I.1.11.
23
For a similar (traditional) breakdown of the diagnosis, see also Duclow, “Perspective and Therapy,” 336 and
Pierre Courcelle, La Consolation dans la tradition litteraire (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1967), 27.
16

prisoner discover himself and find answers to the problems he faces.
Philosophy’s trinity of diagnoses has been variously re-constructed to privilege first one and
then another component of the prisoner’s malaise. John Magee emphasizes the problems of liberty that
arise through the discussion of the world’s “rudders,” suggesting that Philosophy’s primary goal is to
explain the problem of free-will to the prisoner.24 Relihan includes only Philosophy’s promise to help the
prisoner remember his identity among what he claims are the four main promises of the Consolation.25
And Marenbon describes the “dual aim” of the Consolation as that of (a) providing personal consolation
(i.e., making the prisoner happy) and (b) explaining the final cause of things.26 These divergent methods
of parsing Philosophy’s goals are not wrong, but they are incomplete, insofar as none of them accounts
for all of the problems Philosophy raises at the end of Book I.

Philosophy’s implicit consolatory goal
A better way of categorizing the components of Philosophy’s diagnosis is to consider them in
light of an overarching problem that Philosophy identifies in the incipient moments of the text: the
prisoner’s lack of rationality. Philosophy’s first words condemn the Muses of poetry for distracting the
prisoner from rational discourse. These “stage whores,” she says, “choke out the rich fields of reason’s
fruits; theirs are the barren brambles of the passions; they acclimatize the mortal mind to disease, and
do not liberate it.”27 In her opening meter (Meter 2), Philosophy similarly addresses the degeneration of
the prisoner’s rationality, bemoaning his dullness of mind, and his inability to formulate philosophical
questions.28 In Prose 2, she argues that the prisoner has thrown away the “weapons” of philosophy and

24

John Magee, “Boethius’ Consolatio and the Theme of Roman Liberty,” Phoenix 59, nos. 3/4 (2005): 348-364.
Relihan, The Prisoner’s Philosophy, 4-5. The other three promises Relihan attributes to Philosophy are a
treatment of death, a return of Boethius to his true homeland, and harsher remedies.
26
Marenbon, Boethius, 100-102.
27
Boethius, Consolation, I.1.9.
28
Ibid., I.2.2, 24, 6, and 22.
25
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now suffers from “incomprehension.”29 Most notably, the prisoner’s ignorance is also the common root
of the three elements of Philosophy’s diagnosis of his illness at the end of Book I: he doesn’t understand
himself, the final cause of the world, or the workings of providence/fate. In order to discover the
answers to the questions that befuddle him, the prisoner must reclaim his rationality; he must beat back
the “full-scale rebellion of passions” by which he has been “besieged” and regain his self-control.30
It is relatively easy to see how rationality might aid the prisoner in answering the questions
Philosophy has identified; it is more difficult to see how pure rationality can satisfactorily address the
prisoner’s complaints at the beginning of the text. The losses the prisoner has suffered are concrete and
material (his physical freedom and wealth), and those losses have made him miserable. We might
protest, on the prisoner’s behalf, that rationality alone cannot possibly be the cure for his unhappiness.
Surely Philosophy owes the prisoner a better solution than that he can become happy again merely by
thinking about the right sorts of things in the right way. In the books that follow, however, Philosophy
argues precisely this. Rationality, she claims, is the necessary and sufficient condition for true
happiness.31 Her first explicit reference to the relationship between rationality and happiness occurs in
Book II, where Philosophy cites the reclamation of self as the well-spring of the prisoner’s happiness:
But to you I will reveal in brief what the highest happiness hinges on. Is there anything
more valuable to you than yourself? You will say, Nothing. Therefore, if you have
mastery over yourself, you will possess a thing that you yourself would never want to
lose and that Fortune could not ever take away from you.32
As the text unfolds, Philosophy more or less gently directs the prisoner down this interior,
rationality-based path to happiness, a path that leads him away from the world and into the rich
meditations of the mind. Philosophy begins with a series of “practical” arguments in Book II about
concerns close to home (i.e., the prisoner’s loss of fortune), progresses to more theoretical grounds with
29
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a review of human desires in general in the first half of Book III, and nearly leaves the world behind
altogether in rest of Book III and Books IV-V with her conceptually difficult discussions of happiness, fate,
and providence.33 Philosophy’s mandate that the prisoner distance himself from the vagaries of the
world comes with the challenge to possess himself of a more rigorous rationality. He must critically
assess what he has hitherto called happiness and pursue its theoretical implications. This definition of
happiness as rationality is admittedly cold, and almost impossibly abstract, but it does not ignore the
prisoner’s concerns. The prisoner desires happiness, and Philosophy offers him a way to fulfill that
desire.
I said at the beginning of this chapter that an understanding of Philosophy’s consolatory goal
will shape philosophical and literary interpretations of the Consolation in important ways. I would now
add that it is equally important to recognize that Philosophy’s specific goal is to make the prisoner
happy. Philosophy’s promise of happiness, once accorded its proper place as the central goal of the
Consolation, becomes the metric by which we can assess the philosophical consistency and literary
coherency of the text as a whole. If the Consolation is truly non-ironic, then Philosophy’s account of
happiness will be consistent, and she will make the prisoner truly happy. In the following chapters, I
explore the development of Philosophy’s account of happiness, defending its consistency and
demonstrating that, ultimately, she accomplishes her goal.
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2. True Happiness and Fortune

The problem of happiness
Philosophy makes her case for rationality as a necessary and sufficient condition for true
happiness in Books II and III of the Consolation. I have divided her argument into three stages: (1) the
negative definition of true happiness; (2) the negative how-to of happiness; and (3) the positive
definition and how-to of happiness. In the first stage (chiefly Book II), Philosophy argues that the
prisoner has no reason to mourn the loss of his good fortune because good fortune lacks the essential
characteristics of true happiness and is, therefore, not sufficient for true happiness. In the second stage
(primarily sections 1-8 of Book III), Philosophy outlines a series of methods by which true happiness
cannot be obtained, arguing that people pursue “false goods” because they mistakenly believe them to
be necessary for happiness. Finally (in III.9ff), Philosophy argues for a positive definition of true
happiness (true happiness is God, the Good, and the One), a definition which, when taken together with
the negative how-to, leaves the prisoner only one route to true happiness: rationality. Thus, Philosophy
argues that the prisoner will be truly happy iff he is rational.
Philosophy’s account of true happiness is the linchpin of the Consolation, but Marenbon argues
that her account is problematic. It is difficult to determine what, precisely, Philosophy claims about the
relationship between fortune and happiness. Her account of rationality as the necessary and sufficient
condition for happiness implies that good fortune is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness. One
need not have good fortune in order to be happy, nor does having good fortune guarantee that one will
be happy; what happiness does require is rationality, and if one is rational, then one will of course be
happy. Unfortunately for this straightforward account of happiness, there are also sections of text
which indicate that Philosophy actually considers good fortune to be necessary for true happiness.
Philosophy thus appears to provide the prisoner with two accounts of true happiness that are
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inconsistent with one another, arguing both that the prisoner can be happy without the gifts of fortune
and that he needs them in order to be happy. According to Marenbon, this inconsistency derails
Philosophy’s attempt to provide the prisoner with a definition of true happiness and thus lends
credibility to an ironic interpretation of the Consolation.
In this chapter and the following one, I defend Philosophy’s account of true happiness from
Marenbon’s charge of inconsistency. I argue that despite the complexities and apparent incongruities of
the text, Philosophy advances a single, consistent account of true happiness, of which rationality (and
not fortune) is the necessary and sufficient condition. This chapter begins with a brief examination of
Marenbon’s interpretation of the Consolation. I then turn to an analysis of the overarching structure of
Philosophy’s main argument, claiming that it is consistent. Finally, I argue that what Marenbon identifies
as Philosophy’s second account of true happiness is actually the negative component of her primary
account of true happiness. It is a dialectical tool designed to assuage Boethius’s concerns about the gifts
of fortune before presenting him with a new definition of true happiness.

Marenbon’s charge of inconsistency (A)
Marenbon argues that Philosophy advances both a “complex” and a “monolithic” account of
true happiness. Philosophy’s defense of the monolithic account of happiness takes place primarily in
Book III. She begins by arguing that the human telos is true happiness and that true happiness is the
highest Good.34 She further argues that God, in virtue of his character, must be identified with the
highest Good.35 And she concludes that since God and happiness are both the highest Good, “God is
happiness itself.”36 Thus, according to the monolithic account, true happiness resides in a place (or,
more aptly, a being) untouchable by the vagaries of fortune.
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The gifts of fortune are neither necessary nor sufficient for this sort of (monolithic) happiness.
Philosophy claims that mortals deceive themselves if they think that the gifts of fortune alone will make
them happy or if they think that they need the gifts of fortune in order to be happy. Things such as
riches, honor, kingdoms, glory, and physical pleasure, she says, “seem to give mortals images of the true
good, perhaps, or some imperfect goods, but the true and perfect good they cannot bestow.”37 Since
the gifts of fortune are not necessary or sufficient for true happiness, the prisoner, according to the
monolithic account, has no reason to mourn his misfortune.38 He has lost nothing of any real or lasting
value.
Contrast this radical definition of true happiness with what Marenbon calls Philosophy’s
complex account. This nuanced approach to happiness begins in Book II, with Philosophy’s discussion of
fortune, and continues in Book IV. Although Philosophy encourages the prisoner to abandon his foolish
dependence on good fortune in Book II—a step towards the total self-sufficiency advocated in the
monolithic view—she does not make the stronger claim that none of the gifts of fortune are necessary
for true happiness. In fact, she reminds the prisoner that he still possesses a number of valuable gifts of
fortune. His father-in-law, wife, and sons are all still alive, and he still has friends.39 Philosophy appears
to suggest that since the prisoner is still in possession of some gifts of fortune, he has no right to be
entirely miserable; he might, in fact, have good reason to be happy. The argument that the prisoner has
good reason to be happy just because he still possesses some of the gifts of fortune makes hash of
Philosophy’s stern mandates against relying on fortune for happiness. Contra the monolithic account,
her concessions here imply that the prisoner has lost (but also still possesses) something of value after
all.40 There are cases in which good fortune is necessary for happiness.
Marenbon argues that the fact that Philosophy develops two inconsistent accounts of happiness
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undermines her authority as a reliable guide to true happiness.41 Even if it turns out that she ultimately
favors the monolithic account rather than the complex account (as Marenbon claims she does), the
prisoner can have no incentive to trust Philosophy. Why should he prefer the monolithic account when
Philosophy has also presented him with a second, conflicting, and in some ways more intuitive account
of true happiness?42

Establishing the monolithic account
Marenbon’s argument looks formidable, but when one considers the overarching structure of
Philosophy’s arguments, a complex account of happiness never emerges. What does emerge is a welldeveloped and consistent account of true happiness that spans both Books II and III. The account begins
with a discussion of why the gifts of fortune are not sufficient for happiness in Book II, explores why
false goods are not necessary for happiness in III.1-9, and concludes with a definition of true happiness
as rationality in III.9-12. Though Marenbon claims that Philosophy also develops the complex account of
happiness through her discussion of the gifts of fortune, this is not the case. The discussion of fortune
that comprises the first stage of Philosophy’s argument helps to establish the monolithic (and not the
complex) account of true happiness.
As Book II unfolds, Philosophy considers the gifts of fortune from three different angles. She
argues that the gifts of fortune are not sufficient for true happiness because (a) they are transient, (b)
they cannot belong to us, and (c) they are not intrinsically good. This stage of Philosophy’s argument
comprises her negative account of true happiness. It turns out that what good fortune lacks is precisely
what true happiness as rationality has.
Philosophy’s first charge against the gifts of fortune, the claim that their transience renders
them insufficient for happiness, is developed in the first four sections of Book II. Philosophy argues that
41
42

Marenbon, “Rationality and Happiness,” 176.
Ibid., 189.
23

fortune can never result in true happiness simply because the nature of fortune is completely
antithetical to the nature of true happiness:
Consider this so that you may realize that true happiness cannot consist of these
Fortune-born things. If happiness is the highest good of a nature that lives in accordance
with reason; and if the highest good is that which cannot be stolen away in any way at
all, given that only that thing is most excellent that cannot be taken away; therefore, it
is obvious that the instability of Fortune cannot aim at the acquisition of true
happiness.43
True happiness, she claims, is the highest excellence, and the highest excellence cannot be taken away.
The gifts of fortune, on the other hand, can be taken away; they lack an essential component of true
happiness, and thus, the person who relies solely upon them for true happiness will be disappointed.
This discussion of the instability (and therefore insufficiency) of the gifts of fortune in Book II
blossoms into a positive account of true happiness in III.10. Philosophy has already claimed in passing
that one of the characteristics of true happiness is that it is lasting, but it is not until III.10 that she
advances a more sustained argument to support that claim. In III.10, she argues that true happiness is
identical with God and the Good. She claims that because an imperfect good exists (i.e., since there are
things in this world that we consider capable of providing at least a façade of happiness), there must
also exist “a steadfast and perfect good.”44 Further, because nothing can be imagined that is better than
God, and because God is omnipotent, God must himself be the perfect Good.45 Finally, since true
happiness and the Good are identical (as discussed above), “true happiness is located in this highest
God.”46 With this argument, Philosophy moves beyond discussing the nature of true happiness in
negative terms (i.e., explaining that it is not identical with the gifts of fortune) to a more concrete
definition. She argues that the stability which the gifts of fortune lack is a defining characteristic of the
ideas of which true happiness is comprised: the Good that must exist is “steadfast,” and God is eternal.

43

Boethius, Consolation, II.4.25.
Ibid., III.10.6.
45
Ibid., III.10.7-10.
46
Ibid., III.10.10.
44

24

Philosophy’s second charge against the gifts of fortune is that they cannot belong to us and are,
therefore, insufficient for happiness: “*W+hat is there in them *the gifts of fortune+ that could ever truly
belong to you mortals?” she asks the prisoner.47 She attributes our inability to hold onto the gifts of
fortune to (a) their externality and (b) the fact that we can never possess all of a particular gift but only
part of it. Thus, money can never truly belong to us because it is more valuable when it is given away
than when it is hoarded (i.e., it is valuable only when we don’t possess it); the “brilliance of jewels”
belongs to the jewels themselves, not to their observers; and nature operates independently of our
individual wills.48 She argues that since the prisoner is a human being and, therefore, rational, he does
not need to look outside himself for fulfillment or happiness.49 In fact, his reliance upon the external
gifts of fortune actually devalues his nature as a rational human being.50 What the prisoner needs—the
thing that can never be taken away from him—is something that is internal and indivisible.
Like Philosophy’s claims about the transient nature of the gifts of fortune, her discussion of their
externality helps to establish a negative definition of true happiness. By the end of Book II, we know
both that true happiness cannot be transient and that it is not found in things which are divisible or
external to the rational human being. In III.5, Philosophy develops the latter claim in positive terms. She
argues that one of the characteristics of true happiness is that it, unlike the external gifts of fortune, is
self-sufficient:
Therefore, it is human perversity that has divided this thing [true happiness] up, which is
one and simple by nature; and while this perversity strives to secure a part of a thing
which has no parts, it neither acquires this portion, that is a nonentity, nor the whole
itself, which it tries very ineffectually to win.51
Because true happiness is “one and simple by nature” and “has no parts,” we will not be able to obtain it
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by cobbling together bits and pieces of an inadequate fortune.52 And as I will discuss in Chapter 3, true
happiness, because it is rationality, is internal rather than external.
Philosophy’s third charge against the gifts of fortune is that they are intrinsically worthless:
“*W+hat is there in them,” she asks, “that. . .would not become worthless upon close inspection and
careful consideration?”53 She presents two arguments for this position. First, she points out that the
gifts of fortune can be used for good or ill, depending on the character of the person who possesses
them. For example, good people will use their honor and power to benefit society, while evil people will
use their positions to wreak havoc on others. Thus, honor and power have value only insofar as they are
used wisely by people of virtue.54 Second, Philosophy argues that because “it is not the habit of
opposites to join themselves together,” things intrinsically good would never “become the possessions
of those who are most despicable.”55 However, it is clearly the case that the gifts of fortune do in fact
attach themselves to wicked and despicable people: greedy people sometimes possess wealth, people
lacking self-control sometimes abuse the power given them, and unrighteous people sometimes receive
positions of honor.56 “It’s perfectly clear,” Philosophy concludes, “that there is present in Fortune
nothing worth pursuing, nothing that has a goodness that belongs to its own nature.”57
This conclusion dovetails neatly with Philosophy’s later argument that true happiness is the
highest good. If it is the case that the gifts of fortune are not intrinsically good, then, we want to ask,
what is? Philosophy’s response to this potential question is to argue that true happiness is itself the
Good. All human beings, she says, “strive to reach only one single goal: true happiness. And that is the
good thing. . . . It is in fact the highest of all good things and it contains all good things within itself.”58
Each of the primary arguments in Book II about the insufficiency of the gifts of fortune for true
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happiness illuminate an important characteristic of the nature of true (monolithic) happiness. The gifts
of fortune are transient, but true happiness is steadfast. The gifts of fortune can never truly belong to us
because they are external to us and divisible; true happiness, on the other hand, is selfsufficient/indivisible and can only be obtained through the use of reason. Finally, the gifts of fortune are
intrinsically valueless (i.e., they are not intrinsically good), while true happiness is itself the highest
Good. The definition of true happiness that emerges from this (positive and negative) characterization is
what Marenbon calls the monolithic account of happiness: true happiness is steadfast, self-sufficient,
and intrinsically good; true happiness is God, the Good, and the One.

Philosophy’s medicinal approach to the monolithic account
Since the main arguments in Book II and III work together to establish a single, consistent
account of true happiness as monolithic, it seems unlikely that Philosophy would sabotage her work by
introducing a competing view of happiness. But according to Marenbon, Philosophy advances a complex
account of happiness in addition to her monolithic account. He argues that she claims both that fortune
is a necessary condition of true happiness and that true happiness is independent of the gifts of fortune
(i.e., that the gifts of fortune are not necessary for happiness). However, although Philosophy does
sometimes appear to attribute value to the gifts of fortune, the instances in which she does so do not
comprise a distinct account of true happiness. Instead, they are an important component of
Philosophy’s method of establishing the monolithic account.
Philosophy does not begin Book II by providing Boethius with a precise definition of true
happiness. Boethius has spent much of Book I complaining about the things he has lost and the
unfairness of his current situation. He is worried, upset, and clearly unready to remodel his conceptions
of the universe. He does not want to know how to become truly happy; he wants to know why his life
has been destroyed, and he wants his former happiness back. Accordingly, although Philosophy might
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prefer to plunge directly into her account of true happiness (an account that she believes will be the
prisoner’s ultimate cure), she spends Book II discussing the gifts of fortune. She takes time to address
the prisoner’s concerns and to wean him from his dependence on fortune-born happiness before she
attempts to provide him with a concrete definition of true happiness. Philosophy compares this
gradated approach to that of a doctor prescribing a course of medicine to a patient. The patient, she
says, must begin with gentle remedies before moving on to “more caustic ones;”59 he must “take in and
taste something mild and agreeable” and “this will prepare the way for the stronger potions after it has
been conveyed to *his+ inner depths.”60
Once we understand that Philosophy is committed to a gradated consolation, her apparent
inconsistencies can be resolved. When Philosophy appears to suggest in Book II that the gifts of fortune
are necessary for the prisoner’s happiness, she is acknowledging that the gifts of fortune are necessary
for happiness according to the prisoner’s current and erroneous worldview. Philosophy begins her
enumeration of the supposed goods that the prisoner still has left to him by saying, “If it is this empty
name of Fortune-born happiness that excites you so, you may now go over with me just how multiform
and magnificent is your abundance still.”61 Philosophy’s claim is only that, according to his faulty and
fortune-dependent conception of happiness, the prisoner has not lost everything.
Furthermore, even if Philosophy claimed here that the gifts of fortune were necessary for true
happiness (as she conceptualizes it), she would not be contradicting herself. Remember that the
purpose of Book II is to prove that the gifts of fortune are not sufficient for happiness. She has said
nothing, up to this point, about whether or not the gifts of fortune are necessary for true happiness. This
is a problem that she reserves for the next stage of the argument.
Marenbon rejects this “medicinal approach” as a viable explanation for Philosophy’s treatment
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of happiness in Book II. He argues that if it is the case that Philosophy administers first gentle and then
stronger remedies, then Book III ought to begin with a markedly different approach than that advanced
in Book II. But he says, “the argument in Book III up to the end of prose 8 develops a line of thinking
which bears out and extends the approach of Book II.”62
Marenbon’s objection depends on a faulty characterization of the medicinal approach. It is false
to assume that Philosophy’s emphasis on a progression from gentle to stronger remedies necessitates
that Book III begin with “a different outlook” than that developed in Book II. If she is still trying to cure
the same illness, then it makes sense that her stronger remedies will be an extension of the gentler
ones. What the method does demand, however, is that Philosophy’s arguments grow continually
stronger or, to put it in her own terms, harsher. Over the course of the text, her arguments should begin
to focus less on the prisoner’s concerns and be more directly applicable to her own agenda.
There are two examples of this intensification of focus at the beginning of Book III. First, there is
a semantic shift. In Book II, Philosophy discusses gifts of fortune; in Book III, she exchanges the term
“gifts of fortune” for the term “false goods.” This exchange marks an important development in
Philosophy’s arguments. Instead of talking about the problems surrounding the relationship between
fortune and happiness, she is now talking about false happiness. And though she is still only referring to
happiness in negative terms (i.e., addressing what happiness is not instead of defining true happiness),
her shift in terminology has brought her closer to her ultimate goal: a definition of true happiness.
Second, as I will argue in the next chapter, Philosophy devotes the first half of Book III to proving
that the gifts of fortune (reincarnated as the false goods) are not necessary for true happiness. I submit
that this attack on the necessity of the gifts of fortune also represents a strengthening of Philosophy’s
argument. Philosophy begins by telling the prisoner (in Book II) that good fortune is not the only thing
required for happiness, but she leaves open the possibility that it might be necessary for happiness. In
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fact, as Marenbon points out, it looks as if she allows the prisoner to believe that the gifts of fortune he
still possesses might be necessary for happiness, that he still has some of the makings of happiness. In
Book III, the prisoner must confront Philosophy’s claim that good fortune of any kind is not necessary for
happiness. He must give up his dependence on good fortune altogether.

Marenbon’s charge of inconsistency (B) and a response
Thus far, I have shown that Philosophy’s medicinal approach to her consolation reconciles the
apparent inconsistencies in Philosophy’s account of fortune and happiness in Books II and III. Before
concluding this chapter, however, I would like to consider an additional objection to my argument that
Philosophy’s account of happiness is consistent. Marenbon claims that Philosophy’s monolithic account
of happiness is inconsistent, not only with the arguments about fortune which precede it, but also with
the discussion of evil in Book IV.
In the first half of Book IV, Philosophy provides the prisoner with a three-part solution to the
Problem of Evil: she shows, through a variety of arguments, that evil people do not exist, that they are
therefore powerless, and that they always receive their just reward.63 The prisoner assents to this
solution to the Problem of Evil but argues that even if evil people have no real power, bad fortune does:
At this point I said: Now I see what is the happiness, and what is the desolation, that has
been established for the actual merits of the righteous and the unrighteous. But as I
weigh things, there is some good and evil to be found in the very Fortune of popular
opinion. After all, there is not a single wise man who would prefer to be an exile, to have
no resources and no good name rather than to remain unchanged in his own city and to
thrive as one predominant in his wealth and resources, preeminent in his political
honor, and strong in his power. For the proper functioning of wisdom is carried out with
greater renown and to better acclaim in this way, when the true happiness of those who
govern spills over somehow or other into the people who are at their borders, and
especially when. . .the punishments of the legal process are reserved for the destructive
citizens. . . .64
The prisoner’s statement of his problem at first appears to be a defiant repetition of the question he has
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already put Philosophy in Books II and III.65 It appears that, despite Philosophy’s eloquent arguments to
the contrary, the prisoner still refuses to believe that fortune is neither necessary nor sufficient for
happiness, and Philosophy’s response to his complaint fails to resolve the issue.
Philosophy argues that “absolutely every fortune is good” because it has been divinely designed
to train or correct.66 Those who suffer “bad” fortune may serve as an inspiration or a warning to others,
while the fact that both evil and good people are sometimes allotted “good” fortune is a reminder that
this sort of happiness is false and fickle.67 According to Marenbon, this account of fortune (and of the
reward of virtue) is at odds with Philosophy’s claim that the good person is independent of fortune:
[In Philosophy’s earlier discussion,+ ordinary conceptions of happiness were of no
account whatsoever: by being good. . .a person is happy and no explanation at all needs
to be given as to why he is, for instance, imprisoned or being tortured because these
circumstances are quite irrelevant to his happiness. Now, however, Philosophy, by
accepting that some explanation is needed for why a good person is subjected, for
instance, to exile or execution, seems to accept that there is some value in the goods
that are usually regarded as bringing happiness, and some loss of happiness inflicted by
what are normally regarded as evils, although the value of moral goodness is of a higher
order altogether.68
Once again, Marenbon’s argument is that Philosophy’s account of fortune (this time the one provided in
IV.5-7) is inconsistent with the monolithic account of happiness established in the second half of Book
III.
However, the difference between Philosophy’s two treatments of fortune can be explained as a
distinction between ways we might value fortune in relation to happiness. One way of thinking about
the relationship between fortune and happiness is in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (this is
the story Philosophy tells the prisoner in Book III). But another way to think of fortune’s relationship to
happiness is in terms of instrumental value: we might argue that fortune, although neither a necessary
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nor sufficient condition of happiness, is a means to happiness. This is precisely what Philosophy claims in
Book IV:
Since every fortune, be it delightful or calamitous, is handed down sometimes for the
sake of rewarding or training the good, sometimes for the sake of punishing or
correcting the unrighteous, then every fortune is good, since we have agreed that it is
either just or advantageous.69
The fortune-based events in our lives, insofar as they are the instruments of divine justice or true
happiness, are always valuable.
Philosophy provides two arguments for this claim. (1) She says that we cannot always
distinguish good people from evil people and that even if we were able to tell good people from bad
people, we don’t always know what kind of fortune will be useful for an individual person. This means
that sometimes we will be mistaken about the kind of fortune a person deserves or needs. (2)
Philosophy lists a series of cases in which good or bad people are dealt good or bad fortune and shows
how, in each case, the fortune dealt is actually good. She says that a good person might be the recipient
of good fortune because (a) her belief in the truth might falter were she exposed to adversity, (b)
because she is almost as perfect as God and therefore ought to have the perfections of a human being
as well, or (c) because she will be able to use her good fortune to “beat back” unrighteousness; on the
other hand, a good person might also be the recipient of bad fortune so that (a) the “virtue of her mind”
will be strengthened, or (b) so she might provide an example of how evil people cannot overcome good.
Philosophy provides a similar analysis of the fortune of evil people, again arguing that good and bad
fortune improve evil people, make an example of them for others, or demonstrate the insecurity of a
fortune-born happiness.70
This account of fortune emphasizes a different aspect of fortune’s relationship to happiness
than does Philosophy’s earlier account of fortune, but it does not contradict her previous claims. The
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kind of fortune a person receives will depend on her virtue, and it will always be given as a means of
promoting happiness in that person or in the people around her; however, a person can be truly happy
regardless of whether she has been dealt “good” or “bad” fortune. The very fact that what we call good
and bad fortune befall the good (i.e., the happy) and the evil (i.e., the unhappy) should remind us that a
specific kind of fortune is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness.

A consistent account of true happiness
Philosophy does indeed provide the prisoner with a consistent account of true happiness.
Contra Marenbon, she does not claim that fortune is both necessary and not necessary for happiness.
Instead, the arguments in Books II, III, and IV constitute a single account of monolithic (fortuneindependent) happiness. The discussion of the inadequacy of the gifts of fortune for true happiness in
Book II provides a negative characterization of true happiness, while the second half of Book III provides
a positive definition of true happiness as God, the Good, and the One. What Marenbon interprets as a
complex account of true happiness in Book III is actually a component of Philosophy’s medicinal
approach. Philosophy must convince the prisoner that the gifts of fortune are not worth mourning
before she can demonstrate how it is that he can be perfectly happy without them. Finally, the account
of fortune in Book IV is consistent with the account of fortune in Books II and IIII. It suggests that all
fortune has instrumental value, but not that good fortune is necessary or sufficient for true happiness.
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3. True Happiness and False Goods

The how-to of true happiness
Philosophy’s negative and positive definitions of true happiness work together to provide a
single definition of happiness as the monolithic Good. But as Marenbon points out, it is difficult to see
how Philosophy can really claim to have made the prisoner truly happy if she just provides him with a
definition of true happiness.71 It seems unlikely that simply telling the prisoner what true happiness is
will be enough to restore his equanimity—this would be about as effective as promising a cook that you
will share your favorite cake recipe with him and then describing the cake without ever explaining how
to bake it. If Philosophy is serious about consoling the prisoner, then she must go beyond showing him
what true happiness is; she must also show him how to get it.
The beginning of Book III introduces the first component of what I shall call the “how-to” of
happiness. Like the arguments in Book II, sections 1-8 of Book III advance a negative account of
happiness. However, instead of providing a negative definition of true happiness, as the arguments in
Book II do, III.1-8 forms the basis of a negative how-to. Where Book II demonstrates what happiness is
not, III.1-8 explains how not to get happiness. As is the case with the negative definition of happiness,
the negative how-to highlights the essential elements of the positive how-to.

The negative how-to
My reading of III.1-8 is directly opposed to the traditional interpretation of the section, which
holds that it does not fulfill any important literary or philosophical function in the Consolation because it
is primarily repetition. The main proponent of this interpretation is Henry Chadwick, who comments
that
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The first prose section of book iii announces Boethius’ readiness for stronger medicines,
bitter to taste, sweet once swallowed. But the shift is not explicit until the poem O qui
perpetua (iii m. 9) which is both the literary climax of the Consolationi and a major
turning point in its argument. The first sections of the third book recapitulate Stoic
arguments of the type predominant in the second book.72
It is easy to see how such an interpretation might be grounded. Although Philosophy has shifted from
discussing the gifts of fortune to talking about “false goods,” the things she lists as false goods (riches,
honor, power, glory, and physical pleasure)73 are nearly identical to those that comprised her previous
list of the gifts of fortune (riches, honor, power, and glory). Further, the arguments that she uses to
prove that the false goods are not necessary for true happiness are similar to the ones she has already
used in Book II.74 False goods, like the gifts of fortune, are transient, corrupt, and external. Thus, III.1-8
contributes no new material to Philosophy’s argument. The most that can be said of it is that it is the
inexplicit beginning of a new philosophical approach, in which the “Stoic conventions” of Book II are
exchanged for “the sketching of a Platonic metaphysics.”75
Despite evidence of repetition, however, both Marenbon76 and Magee77 note that the first half
of Book III introduces a shift in focus or a new philosophical perspective. III.1-8 is characterized by series
of semantic and philosophical changes in which Philosophy begins to move away from her fortunecentric consolation. At the semantic level, Book II’s gifts of fortune become false goods (beginning in
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III.2.5), while the term “fortune,” so prevalent in Book II, almost entirely disappears.78 At the
philosophical level, Philosophy turns from an analysis of fortune qua fortune to a discussion of why
people consistently miss out on true happiness. Employing her new distinction between true and false
goods, she provides the prisoner with two arguments for why most people aren’t truly happy.
The first argument strongly resembles the one Philosophy advances in Book II, but in addition to
arguing that the gifts of fortune are not sufficient for true happiness, Philosophy also argues that human
beings mistakenly believe the false goods are necessary for true happiness:
As I have said, all mortals try to secure this state by different routes, for the desire for
the true good has been naturally planted in the minds of human beings, but
miscalculation drags them off the path and towards false goods. Now some of these
people think that the highest good is to want for nothing, and they work hard to have
riches in abundance; but others reckon as the good whatever is most worthy of esteem,
and they strive to secure political honors and so be preeminent among their fellow
citizens. There are those who place the highest good in the highest position of power;
such people either wish to be kings themselves or try to stick by the side of those who
are kings. And those who decide that renown is best hurry to prolong their glorious
names by the arts of war or peace. But most people gauge the fruits of a good thing by
joy and delight, and these think it the happiest thing of all to dissipate themselves in
physical pleasure. There are even those who switch the causes and goals of these
pursuits reciprocally: for example, those who desire wealth for reasons of power or
physical pleasures, or those who try to gain power for the sake of money or of
promulgating their names.79
People desire false goods because they think they cannot have the highest good(s) without them. They
pursue “riches, positions of honor, kingdoms, glory, and physical pleasures” because they think that
those things are necessary for “self-sufficiency, preeminence, power, acclamation, and delight.” 80
Philosophy says that this conception of happiness as composed of true goods is partially correct and
reflects human beings’ inherent desire for the Good, but she hastens to add that the false goods,
despite human assumptions and hopes, are not constitutive of those true goods. When the prisoner
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later suggests that true happiness might be obtained if the true goods were sought after all at once,
Philosophy agrees that the sum of the true goods is indeed the source of true happiness; however, one
“will not find it,” she says, “in those things that we have shown to be incapable of bestowing what they
promise.”81
Philosophy’s second argument is that human beings fail to obtain true happiness because they
have mischaracterized it. People think that happiness is composed of differentiated parts when, in fact,
true happiness is composed of a unified whole: “What is simple and indivisible in its own nature, human
miscalculation divides and drags away from the true and the perfect to the false and the imperfect.”82
More precisely, human beings treat self-sufficiency, preeminence, power, acclamation, and delight (the
“true goods”) as separate ends, when, as Philosophy demonstrates, they are actually one and the same
substance: “To be sure, the names self-sufficiency, power, renown, preeminence, and delight are
different, but their substance is not different in any way.”83 People who seek happiness via this mistaken
division of happiness will never be able to secure it or the individual true goods of which they presume it
is composed.84
Taken together, these two arguments provide a reasonably clear account of why it is that people
consistently botch their individual pursuits of happiness. The problem, Philosophy argues, is that we
have misunderstood the nature of, and the relationship among, the true goods. But the arguments do
not just provide an account of the “why” behind our misguided attempts at happiness, they can also be
taken as concrete directives in the art of happiness. They explain how not to be truly happy.
The deployment of the negative how-to is an explanatory move that we encounter in practical
as well as philosophical contexts. We frequently preface our instructions for how to do x with comments
about how not to do x. This is especially common in contexts where the goal is not just to get something
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done, but to teach someone else how to do it. For example, when my brother learned how to play
baseball, my dad told him not to throw the bat behind him after he hit the ball; when I learned how to
whip cream, I was told not to beat the cream for too long; and when my sister started taking piano
lessons, her instructor told her not to play with flat hands. In each of these examples, a directive is
issued, not just to keep someone from carrying out a specific activity (throwing a bat, overbeating
cream, or playing piano with flat hands), but because that specific activity is at odds with the goal of the
primary activity (playing a safe game of baseball, whipping up a bowl of cream, or playing the piano
well). Part of learning how to skillfully execute the primary activity is learning which activities will hinder
the execution of it; that is, learning how not to do it.
Philosophy, as the prisoner’s instructor in the art of happiness, uses the negative how-to just
like my dad used it to teach my brother how to play baseball. Like my dad, she realizes that part of her
task (if she wants to be an effective teacher) is to describe how not to get x. She must gently make the
prisoner cognizant of the error of his ways, showing him what he is doing wrong in his pursuit of
happiness. Thus, the prisoner learns that if he and his fellow seekers of felicity really desire true
happiness, then they should not follow the lead of the people Philosophy has just described. If they
want true happiness, then they ought not believe that false goods are necessary or sufficient conditions
of true happiness, nor ought they believe that true happiness is divisible into separate true goods.

The positive how-to
In addition to blocking dead-end paths to happiness, Philosophy’s negative how-to opens doors
to another, more effective approach to happiness, this one based on rationality. The definition of true
happiness that Philosophy provides the prisoner in III.9 appears to be completely beyond human reach.
If true happiness is, as Philosophy claims, the same as the One, the Good, and God (i.e., if it is
immaterial), then it seems highly improbable that earthly goods—to which human beings have the most
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and easiest access—will be of any use in achieving it. The prisoner, one might think, has every reason to
give up hope of ever being truly happy.
Fortunately, the detachment and rationality that Philosophy has been advocating throughout
the Consolation turn out to be just what he needs. Marenbon comments,
Unsatisfactory though Philosophy’s characterization of true happiness might be, she
seems to think that it is something attainable by the process of reasoning through which
she has led Boethius. Once the nature of true happiness is grasped, it is there to be
enjoyed.85
Philosophy’s purely rational conception of happiness as the One, the Good, and God can only be
obtained via purely rational means. The prisoner no longer needs to worry about crafting his happiness
out of fortune, which is often disappointingly inconstant; he has been shown a much more dependable
route to his goal: the workings of his own mind.
Philosophy’s two explanations for why people miss out on true happiness corroborate her claim
that happiness is rationality. In the first explanation, the things that Philosophy terms “false goods” are
all material and/or temporal. Wealth, honor, kingdoms, glory, and physical pleasure may be able to offer
temporary benefits, but those benefits never last; they are vulnerable to the ravages of time and
thieves. This explanation drives the wedge between the world and happiness—already introduced in
Book II—even deeper. The connection between happiness and the material things which the prisoner
used to take for granted has been rendered wholly implausible; he will have to look elsewhere for the
necessary and sufficient condition for happiness, to something that is not tainted by transience or
earthliness. And what the prisoner needs is exactly what the positive account of the how-to has to offer:
rationality—a happiness which consists of careful thought and argumentation that can be exercised
independently of fortune and false goods.
Philosophy’s second explanation makes the connection between the negative and positive howto’s even more clearly. Philosophy’s claim in the first half of Book III is that people mischaracterize true
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happiness. They have been assuming that happiness is divisible into parts, when in fact it is
quintessentially “One;” this assumption has led them to pursue as individual ends what can only be
obtained as a comprehensive whole. Part of the prisoner’s consolation will be to restore to him an
accurate characterization of true happiness, a task that falls conveniently within the scope of the
rationality Philosophy has been promoting.

The medicinal role of the negative how-to
In the introduction to this chapter, I gave a brief account of why the how-to is important to
Philosophy’s overall consolatory goal. But though it is readily apparent that Philosophy owes the
prisoner an account of how he can get the happiness she has promised him, it is less clear that she owes
him a negative account of the means to that happiness. Why doesn’t she skip over the details of the
failed human attempts at happiness and go straight for the methods that are guaranteed success? The
answer to this question lies in Philosophy’s medicinal consolation.
Philosophy has committed herself to a gradated approach to the consolation. She has promised
the prisoner gentle medicine before bitter and warned him that words of comfort will be followed by
harsher claims and challenges. One of the tensions in III.1-8 is that the arguments presented cannot be
easily categorized as either “strong” or “gentle” medicine. The presence of repetition suggests that III.18 has more in common with the gentle remedies of Book II; on the other hand, the shift in focus
referenced by both Marenbon and Magee hints that the sections might be better characterized as
stronger medicine. As it turns out, neither characterization is entirely wrong. The negative how-to plays
a modulatory role in Philosophy’s consolation, blending gentle medicine with stronger, allowing
Philosophy to complete her negative account of happiness while still moving forward into the final and
strongest stage of the consolation.
There is a sense in which Marenbon is correct to identify III.1-8 as part and parcel of Book II's
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gentle medicine:86 both sections of text lay the negative groundwork for the positive component of
Philosophy’s consolation. Book II is concerned with working out a negative definition of true happiness,
III.1-8 with developing a negative account of the how-to. In the first section, Philosophy weans the
prisoner from his reliance on the gifts of fortune; in the second, she provides him with reasons for why
he should abandon his current approach to happiness. Neither section forms the capstone to
Philosophy’s consolation—the positive account of true happiness in which Philosophy presents her own
definition of happiness and her method of pursuing it. Thus, the reason that Book II and III.1-8 employ
similar arguments and discuss similar topics is just that both sections perform similar functions in the
overarching medicinal approach. There is no dramatic change in topic because Philosophy has nothing
dramatically different to advance. III.1-8 and II are important (and separate) legs of a longer journey; but
they are not the ultimate destination.
However, the lack of a dramatic difference does not mean that III.1-8 does not represent a
significant advancement in Philosophy’s consolation. III.1-8 may not be the consummation of
Philosophy’s medicinal approach (i.e. “strong medicine”), but neither is it “gentle medicine” of the sort
provided in Book II. To begin with, the relationship between the what and the how-to is a hierarchical
one. It only makes sense to talk about how to make or obtain something, if one knows what it is that
one is supposed make or obtain. To return to the examples deployed earlier: it makes no sense for my
dad to warn my brother not to throw the bat behind him after he hits the baseball unless my brother
knows the point is to play a safe game of baseball. Thus, Philosophy’s shift in focus from the negative
what to the negative how-to marks a logical, if subtle, progression in the discussion. This progression is
supported by the structure of Philosophy’s arguments, which, as previously discussed, evidence tighter
logic and a developing philosophical perspective.87
Additionally, the claims Philosophy makes in III.1-8 are emotionally harsher than the ones she
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87

Marenbon, “Rationality and Happiness,” 180.
Cf., Magee, “The Good,” 183-184.
41

advances in Book II. Previously, Philosophy attempted to comfort the prisoner by explaining to him why
the things he has lost are insufficient for happiness. By III.1-8, Philosophy does not seek to comfort, she
seeks to convict. The gifts of fortune/false goods are not just insufficient for happiness; they are also not
necessary for it. And the prisoner, if he continues to believe that those things are necessary for
happiness, will never be happy.
These observations about the “stronger” elements of III.1-8 are corroborated by the section’s
stated purpose. Readers know, from the opening lines of Book III, that Philosophy plans to administer a
stronger dosage of philosophical medicine. The prisoner begins Prose 1 by proclaiming his readiness for
the next stage: “*T+hose remedies that you said were more bitter-tasting—” he says, “I’m not only not
afraid of them, but I demand them passionately, eager to hear more.”88 And Philosophy assents to the
prisoner’s request, explaining “the nature of the remedies that remain: When tasted, they certainly bite;
but when taken deep inside, they turn sweet.”89 Good intentions do not guarantee the successful
completion of a project, of course, but given the evidence cited above, it seems reasonable to grant the
prisoner and Philosophy their claim that III.1-8 constitutes a stronger (though not necessarily the
strongest) medicine.

The results of the negative how-to
The interpretation of III.1-8 as the negative how-to of happiness is advantageous for several
reasons. First, it gives purpose to a section of the Consolation whose function has thus far eluded
commentators. III.1-8 is not a barren stretch of repetition in the midst of a lively conversation; nor is it
an extension of Book III which fails to make good on Philosophy’s promise of harsher remedies; rather,
the section comprises a development in Philosophy’s account of true happiness that has grown out of
Philosophy’s negative definition of happiness and which will grow into her positive account of true
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happiness. Second, my reading of the section demonstrates that Philosophy, as the prisoner’s self-styled
instructor in the art of happiness, is just as interested in teaching the prisoner how to be happy as she is
in teaching him what happiness is. Finally, the idea that III.1-8 plays a unique role in the progression of
Philosophy’s account of true happiness provides further evidence that Philosophy’s arguments about
true happiness are consistent. Philosophy’s account of true happiness as the monolithic good is not in
competition with a more fortune-friendly account (as I showed in the previous chapter); nor is that
account the ad hoc summation of a series of loosely-connected arguments; instead, Philosophy’s
account of true happiness is comprised of distinct building blocks which provide a detailed explanation
of what does, and doesn’t, count as true happiness and of what will, and won’t, lead to it.
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4. A Literary Interlude

The prisoner’s “interruptions”
Like the preceding books of the Consolation, Books IV and V contain intricate philosophical
arguments, but what makes the latter two books unique is that they both begin with an interruption and
digression. No longer the passive, “dumbfounded” prisoner of books I-III,90 the prisoner of Books IV and
V refuses to allow Philosophy to direct the conversation, demanding instead that they pursue topics of
his own choosing. In Book IV, the prisoner interrupts Philosophy with his question about the problem of
evil “just as she *is+ getting reading to say something else,”91 and in Book V, the prisoner introduces the
Problem of Providence despite the fact that Philosophy is “starting to turn the direction of her pleading
toward the treatment and explanation of some other things.”92
For Relihan, the prisoner’s refusal to hear Philosophy out and his insistence that they pursue his
topics of choice demonstrate that the prisoner has taken control of the dialogue and suggest that he
rejects Philosophy’s consolation.93 Now the prisoner is certainly capable of rejecting Philosophy’s
consolation; he might, for a variety of (perhaps justifiable) reasons, be dissatisfied with Philosophy’s
account of happiness and decide, in the end, to refuse it. But notice that if the prisoner does in fact
reject Philosophy’s account of happiness, two important things happen: first, Philosophy fails to
accomplish her consolatory goal (since she will not have made the prisoner truly happy according to her
definition of happiness); second, the prisoner, in rejecting Philosophy, shows that he no longer trusts
Philosophy. If Philosophy can’t make good on her promises, and if the prisoner himself doesn’t trust her,
then what reason does her audience have to trust her? Why should we think she is a reliable guide to
the truth if the prisoner finds her arguments so unconvincing that he is compelled to reject them?
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Philosophy’s failure to convince the prisoner may lead us to abandon the Consolation wholesale, but the
discrepancy between Philosophy and the prisoner’s points of view may also lead us, like Relihan, to posit
an ironic Consolation in which the prisoner purposefully rejects Philosophy.94
I do not think that Philosophy ever loses control of the dialogue, at least in the sense Relihan
intends; rather, she concedes control. The prisoner’s interruptions, and the succeeding philosophical
“digressions” of Books IV and V, prove that Philosophy has fulfilled her consolatory goal. In Book I, the
prisoner was not able to fully articulate, much less answer, his questions about evil and free will. But
once Philosophy helps him reclaim his essential rationality, the prisoner is able to pose much more
sophisticated versions of his initial questions; he is able to facilitate robust philosophical discourse
because now he is truly happy.

The proof of rationality
I argued in Chapter 1 that Philosophy’s overarching goal in the Consolation is to make the
prisoner truly happy. This goal is exemplified in Book I by her implicit commitment to restoring the
prisoner to rationality (the necessary and sufficient condition for true happiness), and by her explicit
sub-goals of explaining to him who he is, what the final cause of the world is, and how the word is
governed. If Philosophy is to meet her consolatory goal, she must fulfill both her explicit and her implicit
commitments: she must make the prisoner rational and answer the questions she has set herself.
By the end of Book III, Philosophy has resolved the explicit problems she identified in Book I as
the source of the prisoner’s illness. 95 Through her account of happiness, she has provided the prisoner
with accounts of the world’s final cause and of how the world is governed. These accounts, together
with the philosophical process in which Philosophy engages the prisoner, have helped him to
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understand himself as a rational human being.
What we have not seen, up to this point, is evidence that the prisoner himself has become
become rational. It is worth pausing here to ask what a proof of rationality would look like. I submit that,
in the prisoner’s case, such proof would be found in his behavior; that is, the prisoner, if he is rational,
will behave rationally rather than irrationally. The prisoner’s behavior is an important component of a
proof of rationality because rationality is active as well as passive. If rationality were strictly passive,
then the prisoner would only need to hear someone else reason well in order to be truly happy, and if
this were the case, Philosophy’s consolation would have been over in Book III. But such passive
rationality is clearly not what we mean when we say that someone is rational. When we call some
rational, we mean that they think and behave rationally (and not just that they listen to what other
rational people have to say). Thus, proof of the prisoner’s rationality will consist in his contributing to
(and not just listening to) rational discourse, where “contribution” includes, but is not limited to, the
philosophical articulation of questions, arguments, and objections, and the ability to direct, as well as
participate in, a philosophical discussion.
In Book I, as well as in Books II and III, the prisoner is characterized by his silence in the face of
Philosophy96 and by his inability to articulate his problems in general or universal terms, rather than as
merely local issues. The prisoner’s lengthy exposition of his woes in Meter 1 and Prose 4 of Book I is
presented as a complaint in which he charges Philosophy and her God with double-dealing: they
promised him that happiness would result from virtue;97 instead, his goodness has reaped only bad
fortune. The problems of evil, providence, and prescience, which he and Philosophy will pursue in Books
IV and V, are hinted at throughout this diatribe, but the prisoner regards them as personal (subjective),
rather than philosophical (objective), problems.
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Attempts at philosophical discourse in Book I
The prisoner attempts to set forth the Problem of Evil mid-way through his monologue in Book I:
[W]hat utterly amazes me is that [sacrilegious men] have accomplished the things that
they hoped for. For we may grant that a desire for what is inferior comes from common
human failing, but that the designs that the lawless entertain are powerful against
innocence while God is watching over it—this is like some monstrosity.98
This summary of the prisoner’s concern is promisingly objective: the prisoner here considers sacrilegious
men in general and wonders why God, who is presumably good, continues to allow bad people to harm
the innocent. The prisoner’s attempt at philosophy, however, collapses into localized complaint almost
immediately. Regardless of the way the universe works, he wants to know why he, in particular, has
been made the victim of injustice: “But you see what was the outcome that awaited my innocence: In
place of reward for true virtue I have incurred punishment for a trumped up charge.”99 Similarly, when
the prisoner broaches the subject of liberty, he does not, in traditional philosophical fashion, contrast
the liberty of the human will with the threats posed to it by fate, providence, or divine prescience;
instead he focuses only on his personal, physical freedom (or lack thereof).100 In fact, the prisoner makes
the claim that if his physical and political liberties have been denied him, then he has no liberty
whatsoever: “For what liberty is left that can be hoped for now?”101
Throughout the prisoner’s monologue, Philosophy remains unmoved, and she clearly regards
the prisoner’s personal complaints as counter-productive.102 In Prose 5, at the end of her summary of
the prisoner’s complaints, Philosophy says:
But ultimately it was your lamentation against Fortune that glowed white-hot; you
complained, in the last lines of your delirious Muse, that rewards are not paid out that
are equal to merits, and you made a wish that the peace that rules the heavens rules
the earth as well. But since a full-scale rebellion of the passions has besieged you; since
depression, anger, and sorrow drag you off in different directions—in your present state
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of mind, the more caustic remedies are not yet appropriate. So let me use the gentler
ones for a time, so that what has grown into a hard tumor from the inrush of confusing
emotions may, by my gentle caress, become more yielding to and susceptible of the
strength of a more bitter-tasting medicine.103
The complaints Philosophy cites are closely related to the philosophical problems of evil and free will:
the complaint that his punishment was undeserved and the complaint that the events unfolding on
earth are ruled by the whims of fortune rather than “the peace that rules the heavens.” But though she
acknowledges the prisoner’s interest in these problems, Philosophy refuses to address them. She argues
that as long as the prisoner is “besieged” by this “full-scale rebellion of the passions,” he will be unable
to withstand “the more caustic remedies.”
I take it (and I have argued in Chapters 2 and 3) that the more caustic remedies are comprised
by the philosophically rigorous account of true happiness, an account which will restore the prisoner to
rationality by showing him the answers to Philosophy’s questions and by showing him how to articulate
and answer his original questions. Thus, Philosophy’s claim here is that the prisoner, in his present state,
cannot engage his questions. Before he can do this, he must relearn how to think rationally, a process
which Philosophy aims to facilitate via a philosophical dialogue about three, essential questions.

Philosophical maturation
For most of Books II and III, the prisoner’s role in the dialogue is passive. He listens and accepts
Philosophy’s arguments, and when he does speak, it is merely to agree with his instructor,104 or, at most,
to feebly remind her of the ills he has suffered.105 Book IV, however, marks a turning point in the
dialogue. Philosophy, the prisoner says,
had sung these words softly and sweetly, never losing the dignity of her appearance or
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the impressiveness of her speech, but I had not yet forgotten the sorrow that was
planted within me, and so I interrupted her train of thought then, just as she was getting
ready to say something else.106
Philosophy has finished her exposition of true happiness and is preparing to turn to a new subject, but
before she can start, the prisoner stops her. Philosophy is still “dignified,” just as she is in Book I, her
speech remains “impressive,” and Boethius is quick to acknowledge that her words are “obviously
divine” and “irrefragable.”107 But, despite his respect for Philosophy, the prisoner is no longer cowed by
her; he has recovered his voice.
Armed with a renewed confidence in his own mind and a solid understanding of the nature of
the Good, God, and the One, the prisoner returns to the issues that confounded him as a Roman citizen
in the first book, and recasts them as objective philosophical problems:108
But here is what is perhaps the greatest cause of my sorrow: the fact that evil things can
exist at all, or that they can pass unpunished, when the helmsman of all things is good.
Make no mistake: Only you can ponder this with the amazement that it deserves. No,
there is another, an even greater thing connected to it: I mean, when gross wickedness
thrives and has dominion, that not only does virtue go without its true rewards, but it is
even forced to grovel at the feet of lawless men and to be ground beneath their heels,
subjected to punishments as if for crimes committed. That such things happen in the
kingdom of a God who knows all things, who is capable of all things, but who desires
good things and the good alone—no one can be amazed at it, and no one can complain
about it, as it deserves.109
In Chapter 5, I break this passage down into what I called “three variations” on the Problem of Evil and
discussed Philosophy’s solutions to them. The fact that the passage can be subdivided in this way
suggests (to me at least) philosophical maturation on the prisoner’s part. But there are several other
important differences between this presentation of the Problem of Evil and its presentation in Book I.
First, the prisoner no longer evokes his own (subjective) misery as an example of the contradiction he is
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trying to articulate. Instead, he turns to Philosophy’s (objective) account of God’s character and
contrasts that with general observations about the nature of the world: Philosophy has proven that God
is essentially good, but, the prisoner argues, we all know that there is evil in the world. Second, the
prisoner phrases his concern as an argument (“If we know x about God, then y ought to follow), rather
than as a complaint (“Why did x have to happen to me?”). Third, Boethius no longer accuses God and
Philosophy of misleading him—an accusation which casts doubt on the usefulness of philosophy as a
whole. Instead, the prisoner recognizes that it is only through philosophy that one will be capable of
probing the depth of the dilemmas he faces. “Only you,” he says, “can ponder this with the amazement
that it deserves.”
One might argue at this point that the dilemmas the prisoner highlights are Philosophy’s fault.
After all, she is the one who has defined God as the Good, and it is precisely this definition which leads
to the three variations on the Problem of Evil. If the prisoner hadn’t listened to Philosophy, then he
would never have run into philosophical difficulties of this caliber. It is worth noting, however, that the
basic problems the prisoner poses in Book IV are the same as those in Book I (he is worried about evil in
both cases). What has changed is the scope of the problems: by Book IV, the prisoner is worried about
all evil and all good people, not just the evil directed toward one good person (himself). Additionally, the
stakes are higher in Book IV than they are in Book I: the prisoner now understands that it is not just his
own virtue and life that is affected by the Problem of Evil, but the very definition of God as wholly Good.

A successful consolation
At the beginning of this chapter, I pointed out that whether or not the prisoner rejects
Philosophy’s consolation has important repercussions for an interpretation of the Consolation. I also
argued that we can make sense of the prisoner’s apparent rejection of Philosophy by considering it in
terms of the prisoner’s philosophical development. Philosophy’s ability to meet her consolatory goals is
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contingent, in part, upon proof of the prisoner’s rationality. He can be said to have been made happy
only if he is able to fully participate in philosophical discussion, i.e., if he is able to articulate problems as
philosophical, rather than personal, problems, and if he is able to direct, as well as follow, a
philosophical conversation.
The arguments above demonstrate that by Book IV the prisoner has recovered enough to
(re)direct the conversation and philosophically articulate his initial questions; he knows that rationality
is necessary and sufficient for true happiness, and he is capable of exercising that rationality in
philosophical discourse. The prisoner’s “interruptions” and “digression” are not proof that he rejects
Philosophy’s consolation, but that he embraces it. Philosophy has accomplished her consolatory goal,
and, in consequence, her audience has no reason to mistrust her. There is no hint of literary irony in the
Consolation.
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5. A Philosophical “Digression”

Old questions, new attitudes, conflicted solutions
Let us grant, then, that the prisoner’s increased control of the dialogue should not lead us to
suspect Philosophy’s authority. The topics of Books IV and V have not been selected by Philosophy, but
this doesn’t mean she has failed to make the prisoner rational/happy. The prisoner, restored to
rationality, is anxious to return to the questions that initially troubled him and settle them
philosophically. Like an eager and dutiful student, he wants to make good use of the new perspective
Philosophy has given him. More problematic than the prisoner’s attitude toward Philosophy are the
results of his questioning. Relihan and Marenbon argue that Philosophy, faced with the prisoner’s
account of unjust punishment and the rampant evils with which the earth is filled, offers only a series of
invalid and contrived arguments in defense of her theory of the universe; and in the end, even her
brilliant defense of free will is undermined by her inability to reconcile the problems of Providence and
Prescience.110
Philosophy’s inability to resolve the prisoner’s problems has serious implications for my reading
of the Consolation. Philosophy has promised the prisoner that rationality, and rationality alone, is the
cure for what ails him. But if Philosophy—the ultimate symbol of rationality—cannot answer the
prisoner’s questions, then we, like Marenbon and Relihan, have reason to question the success of
Philosophy’s consolation. Perhaps the Consolation is intended to be ironic after all. Perhaps the point is
not that rationality is the ultimate solution to the prisoner’s problems but that there are limits to how
far philosophy can take us.111
This is not what I argue in this chapter. In this chapter, I argue that we ought not give up on
Philosophy, because Philosophy, as it turns out, has not failed us. Although she may have intended to
110
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take Boethius in another direction before his interruptions, Philosophy’s solutions to the problems of
evil, providence/prescience, and free will are valid, and they are consistent with her account of
happiness as rationality.

Variations on the Problem of Evil
At the beginning of Book IV, the prisoner outlines three problems that he believes can be
derived from the conjunction of his own experience and Philosophy’s claims about the nature of God:
(A) According to Philosophy, God is and desires only good; additionally, God is omniscient and
omnipotent. But as Boethius has had ample opportunity to discover, evil things exist and go
unpunished. God cannot will the existence of evil (because he desires only good); however, if
evil exists contrary to God’s will, then God is not omnipotent.
(B) God desires only good and he is omnipotent. If God desires only good, and if he is omnipotent,
then he will want good people to triumph over (or be more powerful than) evil people, and he
will arrange things such that good people are more powerful than evil people. However, evil
people are frequently more powerful than good ones. Therefore, God does not desire only good
or he is not omnipotent.
(C) God desires only good and he is omnipotent. If God desires only good, and if he is omnipotent,
then he will want virtue (the goodness of people or good people) to be rewarded. However, the
existence and power of evil people prevents good people from receiving their just reward.
Therefore, God is either not omnipotent or he doesn’t desire good.
Each of these problems can be described more generally as a variation on the problem of evil: How can
a good God allow or condone evil?
Philosophy begins her solution to this tripartite problem with the prisoner’s second version of
the Problem of Evil (B): “Therefore,” she says, “you will first be permitted to realize that power is always
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the possession of good people, and that evil people are always deserted by every one of their strengths.
. .”112 Philosophy makes a series of arguments for this conclusion, but the primary one, and the one
whose validity is questionable, is the argument I sketch below:
(1) Nothing can be created or accomplished without both will (or desire)
and power. [Premise (IV.2.5)]
(2) Power is the ability to obtain what one desires. [Premise: meaning of power]
(3) All people, both good and evil, desire true happiness (which is the Good).
[Premise (IV.2.10-12), the conclusion of arguments in Book III]
(4) People become good by obtaining the Good. [Premise (IV.2.13)]
(5) Good people are powerful. [2, 3, 4 (IV.2.15)]
(6) If evil people obtained what they desired, they could not be evil. [4 (IV.2.14)]
(7) Evil people do not obtain what they desire. [6]
(8) Evil people are not powerful. [2, 7 (IV.2.15)]
This is an argument that Boethius was previously unable to comprehend because he lacked premise (3),
knowledge of the final cause. Now that he knows that all people desire the Good, but that only some of
them (the good people) obtain it, he is able to understand why evil people are not truly powerful.113
Thus, it looks as if Philosophy is able to consistently employ her previous account of the monolithic Good
in her first answer to the problem of evil.
However, Marenbon claims the argument’s validity is compromised by premise (4). Premise (4)
makes a claim about the relationship between moral goodness and the Good: once people obtain the
Good, they will themselves be good. This claim appears to derive from Philosophy’s previous argument
that once people obtain the Good, they will be truly happy because true happiness and the Good are
identical. Based on this, one might argue that if people who obtain the Good are truly happy, then they
112
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are also the Good (or they somehow participate in the Good). However, there is a key difference
between Philosophy’s Book III argument about the Good and her claim in premise (4): in the first case,
Philosophy is talking about goodness qua the Good; in the second case, her claim is about moral
goodness. And thus far, Philosophy has given us no reason to believe that the Good and moral goodness
are identical.114
Marenbon’s concern would be relevant if we were approaching the text from a Kantian
perspective, in which moral considerations are sharply distinguished from (and prioritized above) nonmoral ones. But this approach is anachronistic. Boethius has been steeped in ancient Greek and Roman
philosophical and literary traditions, traditions in which morality was not prioritized above other
values.115 For Boethius, good and evil are not contingent upon a person’s specific moral actions, but
upon the kind of human being one is. In the Consolation, good and evil people are thus distinguished
from one another by their virtues and vices rather than by which actions they have or have not
committed: the prisoner asks Philosophy to prove that the virtues of good people are always rewarded
while the vices of evil people do not go unpunished.116 Thus, we have little reason to think either that
the prisoner expects Philosophy to hold forth on the relationship between morality (as we think of it)
and the Good or that Philosophy is obliged to cater to such a request.
In fairness, Marenbon is not the only scholar to approach the Consolation this way. Magee also
explains that Books II-IV are designed
to draw out the moral implication of the conclusions reached by the end of Book 3,
more precisely, to explain how evil can exist in a world that is universally governed by
the Good. . . . Book 4 emerges as a necessary continuation [of Book 3] by applying the
metaphysics of the Good to moral considerations that have troubled ‘Boethius’ from the
start.117
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Magee’s claim that Book IV is a “necessary continuation” of Book 3 supports the interpretation of the
Consolation I have advanced so far. But his analysis of the nature of that continuation, like Marenbon’s,
is heavily influenced by our modern Kantian intuitions. Magee’s description of the Problem of Evil in
moral terms doesn’t take into account the fact that the evil men to whom Boethius refers have earned
the title because of their failure to flourish as human beings (see arguments below), not because of their
failure to adhere to a moral code.
Philosophy’s account of rationality and happiness has provided the prisoner with an explanation
of what it means to be a “good” human being:
[I]f it is agreed that the possession of anything is more valuable than the thing to which
is belongs, then you in your own valuation place yourselves beneath them when you
determine that these most worthless objects are your possessions. This happens
deservedly, for this is the condition of human nature: only then does it surpass all other
things, when it knows itself; but that same nature is degraded, brought lower than the
dumb animals, if it ceases to know itself. It is merely a part of their nature that other
animate creatures are unaware of themselves, but for human beings this is morally
reprehensible.118
Philosophy is here concerned with the essence of human nature, i.e., the quality or virtue that makes a
human beings “surpass all other things.” The person who is truly human, according to Philosophy, is the
person who knows herself, who recognizes that her happiness is independent of the gifts of fortune.
This same person, I take it, is “good”—not because she is doing the right moral thing and refraining, e.g.,
from murder or theft, but because, insofar as she knows who she is, she is engaged in the activity that
makes her human.
This non-moral account of human goodness becomes the basis for Philosophy’s solution to the
first variation on the Problem of Evil (A). Philosophy submits three reasons that evil people might fail to
obtain the Good: (1) they don’t know what it is; (2) they know what it is but allow themselves to be
distracted by “lust”; or (3) “they desert the Good knowingly and willingly, and cast themselves off
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towards the vices.”119 Philosophy’s point in this section is that, whichever way one looks at it, evil people
are powerless. But she also makes the surprising claim that if evil people knowingly desert the good,
they also stop existing: “But in this way they not only cease to be powerful, but cease even to exist at all;
after all, those who abandon the common goal of all the things that are also quit existing as well.”120
This claim is counter-intuitive, but Philosophy has the resources she needs to defend it. I submit
that the most charitable reading of Philosophy’s claim (and it is admittedly hard to be charitable) hinges
on her definition of the word “exist” and her conception of the human being. Philosophy says that she
“*does+ not reject the statement that evil men are evil men; but *she does+ deny that they exist in a pure
and simple sense.”121 In the next prose section, she will remind the prisoner that “*he has+ learned just a
little while ago that everything which exists exists as one thing, and the One itself is the Good; the logical
consequence of this is that everything that exists seems in fact to be good.”122 For Philosophy, then,
existence “in a pure and simple sense” is the monolithic Good.
Understood in this way, existence is not, as we might at first think, contingent on being human.
Although Philosophy thinks that desire for the Good characterizes human beings, she has not committed
herself to the claim that this desire for the Good is what makes human beings exist. Existence, she
seems to think, is contingent, not on desire for the Good, but on its actual acquisition: in order to exist,
one must have obtained the Good. It turns out that all good people desire, and have obtained, the
Good; therefore, all good people exist (in “a pure and simple sense”). Evil people, on the other hand, are
characterized by their failure to obtain the Good, so they don’t exist (in “a pure and simple sense”).
Philosophy’s account of rationality, happiness, and the monolithic Good also provides a solution
to the prisoner’s final variation on the Problem of Evil (C). In IV.3-4, Philosophy argues that the nature of
the Good ensures that virtue is rewarded and evil does not go unpunished. The good person’s reward is
119
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the Good itself, because happiness is the Good itself and the Good is the final cause.123 Likewise, the
relationship among rationality, happiness, and the Good ensures that evil people are always
appropriately punished, regardless of how things appear to us (i.e., regardless of whether or not they
possess material goods). If evil people possess material goods, it is not a reward but a self-inflicted
punishment, insofar as reliance on material goods will only further erode their humanity and,
consequently, make them more unhappy.124 If, on the other hand, evil people are stripped of their
power and wealth, they are undergoing a rehabilitative punishment that will wean them from false
goods and allow them to once more participate in the Good and true happiness.125
This third solution is dissatisfying to modern ears, but it is consistent with Philosophy’s previous
claims about the Good, and the individual claims of the argument are likewise consistent with one
another.126 Additionally, the arguments Philosophy presents in these sections derive their premises from
the conclusions she reaches about true happiness in Book III. While this kind of coherency is not
necessary for the consistency or validity of the arguments, it nevertheless demonstrates the kind of
thematic coherency that is important to a literary analysis of the Consolation, suggesting that the text is
not a hodgepodge of literary motifs and philosophical points of view, but a unified whole.

The problems of providence, prescience, and free will
Philosophy’s solution to the third variation on the Problem of Evil effectively replaces the
uncertainty of fortune with the certainty of divine Providence. Once this solution is coupled with her
arguments from Books II and III, there is no longer any place for fickleness in the scheme of things,
whether we are considering the nature of happiness or the reward and punishment of good and evil
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people.127 The conception of the universe as essentially ordered, however, gives rise to a new problem,
which Marenbon calls the “Problem of Providence:”128 If each person’s lot in life is determined by
Providence, then how can human beings have free will? As the prisoner puts it, “*I+n this sequence of
causes, so attached to one another—is there any freedom of our independent judgment? Or does the
chain of fate tie together the very motions of human minds as well?”129
Philosophy’s response, like her responses to the Problem of Evil, is drawn from her previous
account of human nature. Throughout the Consolation, Philosophy has argued that human beings are
rational. Now she adds that every rational being, because it is rational, has the ability to discriminate
among possible courses of action: “it distinguishes between things that it must avoid and things that it
must choose on its own.”130 Moreover, once a rational being has made a decision about what to do (or
avoid), it seeks to do (or avoid) that thing. Thus, all human beings, because they are rational, have the
ability to make choices about what they want (to desire one thing rather than another): “For this reason,
within the beings that have reason present within them, a freedom to want and not want is present as
well.”131 For Philosophy, independence of judgment cannot be explained in terms of fate or a causal
chain because it is entirely different from the other events that characterize our lives. As Marenbon
explains,
If I rationally willed to do or not to do x, the correct explanation for this act of volition is
not that it resulted from a certain set of causes, but that I willed it so, because I
discerned that x is desirable or undesirable in itself. Acts of will, then, are in principle
unlike every other sort of act and event.132
However, while Philosophy thinks that all human beings have free will, she doesn’t think they
are all equally free. She argues that “ethereal substances” have a greater freedom of judgment than
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physical substances. As a result, human beings are most free when they “preserve themselves intact
within the contemplation of the divine mind;” if they allow themselves to be swayed by passions and
choose vice instead of virtue—i.e., if they “fall away from” reason—they impair their free will.133
This argument is consistent with Philosophy’s previous arguments about the nature of human
beings. If human beings are rational and their rationality consists in their participation in the Good, it
makes sense that if human beings cease participating in the Good, they will lose a commensurate
amount of rationality and, hence, free will. However, anxious to solidify her main point, which is that all
things are divinely ordered, Philosophy concludes her argument by claiming that all individual choices
fall beneath the gaze of divine Prescience, “a gaze that from eternity looks out at all things in advance”
and “assigns to their merits each and every thing that has been predestined for them.134 This claim
instantly gives rise to a new problem (what the prisoner calls “a still more difficult doubt”135): If God
foresees everything, then, in keeping with his perfection and infallibility, everything God foresees must
happen; and if everything that is foreseen must happen, there cannot be any freedom of judgment.136
The prisoner is anxious to resolve this problem for two reasons. First, he points out that if there
is no free will, then “rewards and punishments are set before good and evil people in vain—no free and
voluntary motion of their minds has deserved them.”137 If Philosophy has no solution to the Problem of
Prescience, then her defense of the justice of God’s providence is destroyed. Second, the prisoner is
concerned that the loss of free will negates “*t+hat one and only avenue of exchange between human
beings and God:” prayer.138 This second concern is surprising because, up to this point, the prisoner
hasn’t mentioned prayer, and Philosophy hasn’t included it in her discussion of the necessary and
sufficient conditions for obtaining happiness (God, the Good, and the One). But the prisoner thinks that
133
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prayer is the only way human beings can communicate with God “before they succeed in attaining it,”
and because prayer provides this connection with God, he is anxious to preserve it.139 It is important to
notice that Philosophy and the prisoner don’t discuss whether prayer is necessary for “attaining” God,
and neither one suggests that it is. Thus, while the introduction of prayer here is surprising, it is not
inconsistent with Philosophy’s previous account of God.
Philosophy’s solution to the Problem of Prescience can be divided into three parts.140 In the first
part, Philosophy argues that there are four different kinds of knowledge (“modes of cognition”) and that
each kind has a distinct object: the object of sense perception is material particulars; the object of
imagination is shape; the object of reason is the universal; and the object of understanding is the One.141
These modes of cognition are hierarchically ordered so that sense perception (the lowest mode) cannot
know shapes, universals, or the One, but understanding (the highest mode) can know material
particulars, shapes, and universals.142 The consequence of the Modes of Cognition principle is that
beings can know things in different ways. Human beings are endowed with sense perception,
imagination, and reason, but they do not have understanding; thus, they do not “see” the world in the
way that God (who has understanding) does.143
In the second part of her argument (Prose 6), Philosophy argues that in order to understand
God’s perspective of the world, we have to understand divine nature. Returning to her claims about the
nature of God, the Good, and the One, Philosophy reminds the prisoner that God is eternal, and since a
being’s nature determines the kind of knowledge it has, she concludes that God’s knowledge is not
confined by time: “[S]ince God has an ever-eternal and ever-present-moment condition, his knowledge
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as well has passed beyond all motion of time and is stable in the simplicity of its own present. . .”144
God’s prescience is thus not a knowledge of things to come but a knowledge of what already is.
This claim leads Philosophy to the third and final part of her argument, where she makes a
distinction between two kinds of necessity: simple and conditional. Philosophy lists as a simple necessity
“the fact that all human beings are mortal,” while a conditional necessity is described as the fact that “it
is necessary that a man is walking if you know that he is walking.”145 God’s knowledge of the eternal
present involves both simple and conditional necessity, but his knowledge of human judgment involves
only conditional necessity. The fact that he knows what human beings will decide does not mean that
they have to make a particular decision (simple necessity), but that since they are making a particular
decision, and since God knows what that decision is from the perspective of the present, they must be
making a particular decision (conditional necessity).146
The three components of Philosophy’s argument can be summarized thusly: (1) Different beings
have different kinds of knowledge; (2) God’s knowledge is atemporal; and (3) God’s present knowledge
of human judgment imposes only conditional necessity on free will. Thus, human beings are free to
choose otherwise, and God knows every decision we will make because he sees us as we make it. This
argument explains how human beings have free judgment despite God’s prescience, it supports
Philosophy’s previous account of the justice of divine reward and punishment, and it preserves prayer as
a valuable means of communion with God. But it fails to address a problem the prisoner raised at the
beginning of the discussion.
In Prose 3, the prisoner worried that even if we prove that human free will is compatible with
divine prescience, we won’t have proved that Philosophy’s account of God’s nature is compatible with
human free will. If the fact that we are walking along the road is not determined by God’s prescience; if,
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in fact, God knows we are walking along the road because we are walking along the road; then isn’t
God’s knowledge in some way dependent on human judgment? And isn’t this contrary to Philosophy’s
account of the self-sustaining nature of God?
At the end of Prose 6, Philosophy responds to the prisoner’s concern that even conditional
necessity makes God dependent on human judgment, saying,
It is not from the coming to pass of future events but rather from his own proper
simplicity that God has been allotted this present grasping and seeing of all things. And
from this also comes an answer to the problem you posed just a little while ago, that it
is an unworthy thing that our future actions be said to provide a cause for the
foreknowledge of God. For such is the force of this knowledge, embracing all things by
its present-moment knowledge, that it has itself established the status of all things,
while it owes nothing to things that are subsequent to it.147
Philosophy’s main point is that God’s knowledge does not depend on our individual choices. But her
(admittedly vague) claim that God’s knowledge “establishes the status of all things” raises a serious
problem: Does Philosophy mean here that God’s knowledge determines all things, and therefore “owes
nothing to things that are subsequent to it?”148 If she does, then, as Marenbon points out, she is flatly
contradicting her previous claim that God’s knowledge does not determine human actions. But perhaps
Philosophy intends her claim to be read more subtly. One alternative reading of this passage, suggested
by Sharples, is that Philosophy claims only that God’s prescience does not depend on future actions,
since he dwells in an eternal present.149 However, this interpretation only explains why human actions
don’t determine God’s knowledge; it ignores the most contentious element of Philosophy’s claim, which
is that God’s knowledge necessitates human actions.
A better interpretation of this passage reads it as a claim about the relationship between the
human and divine capacities for knowledge, instead of a claim about the relationship between individual
human decisions and divine knowledge. Human beings are able to make judgments because they are
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essentially rational. And since human beings’ rationality results from their participation in the Good (or
God), they owe their ability to make judgments to God. Thus, God establishes the status of all things
because the judgment-making capacity of all things is derived from his existence. Conversely, the
individual choices made by human beings are undetermined; however, the fact that human beings have
the capacity to make individual choices is determined by God’s existence (i.e., if God didn’t exist, then
neither would rational, choice-making human beings).
This reading of Philosophy’s final comment about divine prescience is corroborated by her
conclusion to the Consolation. Philosophy clearly does not think that her defense of God’s independence
has compromised her claims about human free will. On the contrary, her conclusion reiterates her main
arguments in Books IV and V: good and evil people are justly reward and punished; this is consistent
with “an inviolate freedom of independent judgment;” and this freedom of judgment, in turn, is
consistent with the unchanging, independent nature of God.150 If there is any necessity at all, Philosophy
concludes, it is to be found only in the “necessity of righteousness,” the mandate that our participation
in the Good—our rationality—lays upon us to be virtuous.151

A new consolatory narrative
The questions the prisoner poses Philosophy in the last book of the Consolation are difficult, but
Philosophy successfully navigates them. Her accounts of evil, providence, and prescience are consistent
with each other and with her overarching account of human and divine nature, and through them she
justifies divine reward and punishment, proves human free will, and preserves the efficacy of prayer.
Thus, if the Consolation is ironic, it is not because Philosophy fails to answer the prisoner’s questions—
but neither is it because the prisoner rejects Philosophy’s consolation (see Chapter 4) or because
Philosophy’s account of happiness as rationality is inconsistent ( see Chapters 1-3). The literary and
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philosophical inconsistencies that were supposed to provide evidence for an ironic Consolation have
been dissolved.
What we are left with is a Consolation that is philosophically valid and literarily coherent.
Philosophy’s goal is to make the prisoner happy, and she does so. She provides him with a definition of
happiness, tells him how to get it, and walks him through the process of obtaining it. Her dialectical
proof of rationality as happiness begins by persuading the prisoner that the gifts of fortune are not
sufficient for happiness; it then shows him why good fortune/false goods are not necessary for
happiness; and it concludes with a picture of a monolithic happiness which the prisoner is, at that point,
able to comprehend and accept. The prisoner, restored to rationality and eager to test its power,
reintroduces his initial questions about free will and evil. But this second interrogation is different from
the first for two reasons: (1) the prisoner is now able to pose his questions as philosophical rather than
personal problems, and (2) Philosophy answers them.
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Postscript:
Consolation and Satisfaction

The conclusion of the Consolation is triumphant. Restored to his rightful rationality, the prisoner
no longer has a reason to be downcast in the face of bad fortune. He understands the nature of God, the
nature of the world, and his place in the scheme of things, and though his body may still be imprisoned,
his mind is entirely free. Philosophy has navigated him though a series of increasingly complex
problems, and her consistent and valid solutions to those problems have demonstrated that the
prisoner’s rationality will not fail him unless he fails it.
However, to say that the Consolation is triumphant, and to say that it is not ironic, is not
necessarily to say that it is satisfying. The Consolation is satisfying in at least one sense of course: it is
satisfying for the prisoner—otherwise the prisoner would not have yielded to the cure and, therefore,
would not be truly happy. But though Philosophy may have made the prisoner truly happy (in her sense
of the word), the rest of us may remain unhappily unconvinced. Philosophy’s definition of happiness as
rationality is too austere for modern taste, and her neoplatonic bundling of rationality and happiness
with God, the Good, and the One is equally unappealing.
The great advantage of Relihan’s and Marenbon’s interpretations of the Consolation is that they
attempt readings that satisfy modern readers of the text. They explain how the Consolation can be a
great literary and philosophical work, despite the distastefulness of some of its ideas; the flavor of irony
lends postmodern credence to a text that might otherwise come across as woefully outmoded.
However, the unfortunate consequence of this approach is that it discourages us from interacting with
the ideas Boethius presents. An ironic interpretation of the Consolation gives us license to read the text
without ever stopping to reflect on its arguments.
My reading of the Consolation doesn’t allow the reader to sidestep the claims at the heart of the
Consolation. I argue that Boethius’ Consolation is a genuine attempt to answer questions that have
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puzzled human beings for millennia; further, it is an attempt that turns out to be successful, insofar as
the answers provided are consistent; thus, if we think Philosophy’s definition of happiness is a bad one,
or that her solutions to the problems discussed are flawed, then we had better be prepared to explain
why. In short, my interpretation of the text leads the reader to first-order philosophy. It challenges us to
reconsider the problems of fortune, human happiness, fate, evil, providence, and free will as they are
presented in the Consolation, just as Philosophy challenges the prisoner to reconsider them at the
beginning of the text, and just as Boethius intended to challenge his readers centuries ago.
After reading the Consolation, we may come to the conclusion that Boethius’ arguments are not
only dissatisfying but also unsound, or we may find that his arguments are both sound and satisfying.
Regardless of the particular conclusion at which we arrive, I submit that the very process of coming to
any conclusion at all offers its own variety of satisfaction. As readers of the Consolation, we become
participants in the dialogue. We, like the prisoner, are invited to explore what is at stake in the problems
discussed and what their solutions might look like. More importantly, as we question and challenge the
text’s claims, we develop a greater appreciation of our own capacity for reason.

67

Bibliography

Boethius. Consolation of Philosophy. Translated by Joel C. Relihan. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001.

Chadwick, Henry. Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy. New York:
Oxford UP, 1981.

Courcelle, Pierre. La Consolation dans la tradition litteraire. Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1967.

Curley III, Thomas F. “How to Read the Consolation of Philosophy.” Interpretation: A Journal of Political
Philosophy 14 (1986): 211-63.

Duclow, Donald F. “Perspective and Therapy in Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy,” The Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy 4, no 3 (1979): 334-343.

Fortin, John. “The Nature of Consolation in The Consolation of Philosophy,” American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly 78, no 2 (2004): 293-307.

Haldane, John. “De Consolatione Philosophiae.” In Philosophy, Religion, and the Spiritual Life, edited by
Michael McGhee, 31-45. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Harding, Brian. “Metaphysical Speculation and Its Applicability to a Mode of Living: The Case of
Boethius’ De Consolatione Philosophiae.” Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und
Mittelalter 9 (2004): 81-92.

Magee, John. “Boethius’ Consolatio and the Theme of Roman Liberty.” Phoenix 59, nos 3/4 (2005): 348364.

-----. “The Good and morality: Consolatio 2-4.” In The Cambridge Companion to Boethius, edited by John
Marenbon, 181-206. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009.

68

Marenbon, John. “Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter
2009 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta. 6 May 2005.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/boethius/> (19 March 2010).

-----. Boethius. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003.

-----. “Rationality and Happiness: Interpreting Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy.” In Rationality and
Happiness: From the Ancients to the Early Medievals, edited by Jiyuan Yu and Jorge J.E. Gracia,
175-197. Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2003.

-----, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Boethius. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009.

McEvoy, James. “Ultimate Goods: happiness, friendship, and bliss.” In The Cambridge Companion to
Medieval Philosophy, edited by A.S. McGrade, 254-275. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003.

Means, Michael H. The Consolatio Genre in Medieval English Literature. Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 1972.

Nussbaum, Martha. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and
philosophy, Rev. Ed., Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007.

Relihan, Joel C. The Prisoner’s Philosophy: Life and Death in Boethius’s Consolation. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007.

Scourfield, J.H.D. Introduction to Consoling Heliodorus: A Commentary on Jerome, Letter 60. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993.

Shanzer, Danuta. “Interpreting the Consolation.” In The Cambridge Companion to Boethius, edited by
John Marenbon, 228-254. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009.

Sharples, Robert. “Fate, prescience and free will.” In The Cambridge Companion to Boethius, edited by
John Marenbon, 207-227. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009.
69

